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Abstract: Public tertiary education systems in the EU Member States are studied by comparing used 
resources with education and research outputs and outcomes. Efficiency in public tertiary education 
systems across EU countries plus Japan and the US is assessed with semi-parametric methods and 
stochastic frontier analysis. A core group of efficient countries is identified. A good quality secondary 
system, output-based funding rules, institutions’ independent evaluation, and staff policy autonomy 
are positively related to efficiency. Moreover, evidence is provided that public spending on tertiary 
education is more effective in what concerns labour productivity growth and employability when it is 
coupled with efficiency.  
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  2Introduction 
 
This is the final report of a study on the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending on 
tertiary education in the EU commissioned by the Directorate General Economic and 
Financial Affairs of the European Commission to an ISEG/Technical University of Lisbon 
team, under contract number ECFIN/329/2007/486218. 
 
In this report we outline the conceptual framework, present data, and discuss the appropriate 
input, output, and environment indicators, and take into account the specific features of each 
country in order to compare properly the tertiary education systems in the EU Member States. 
Special care is given to the wide-ranging nature of tertiary education, where research and 
teaching activities cohabit from the individual to the institutional level.  
 
Efficiency of public spending on tertiary education is evaluated using two different methods: 
a semi-parametric method and the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The first method 
includes data envelopment analysis (DEA) as a first stage and the regression of the obtained 
efficiency scores on explanatory factors as a second step. The latter is essentially a regression 
of total tertiary education cost on the considered outputs and factor costs, including the 
explicit modelling of country-specific efficiency scores. Results from the semi-parametric and 
SFA methods are essentially consistent. A core of more efficient European countries is 
identified (the UK and the Netherlands), while important inefficiencies are recognised in other 
countries. Countries with secondary education systems of good quality and where tertiary 
education is organised along certain lines (in terms of staff policy autonomy and flexibility, of 
independent and public evaluation of institutions, and of output oriented funding rules) tend to 
obtain better results in education and research from the resources used.  
 
Effectiveness of tertiary education is the relation between this activity and final goals rather 
than closely related outputs. As a matter of fact, tertiary education is one of the driving forces 
of growth. In this report we show that there is a link between labour and total factor 
productivity and spending in education. However, this link is only effective when spending is 
efficient. In other words, what really matters is that money and resources are spent in such a 
way that one gets outputs that in a broader layer are related to productivity and growth. 
Moreover, we present evidence of a link between tertiary education efficiency and 
  3employability. Unemployment rates among tertiary education graduates are lower than those 
among individuals that attained secondary level only, and this difference increases when 
public tertiary education is more efficient. 
 
This report is organised as follows. The first section covers the important definitions of 
efficiency, effectiveness, and related concepts and sets some key measurement issues. We 
include a description of collected data and present some indicators constructed from them. 
The analysis provided is introductory and intends essentially to describe data and their 
usefulness for the subject at hand, and to give the reader a first impression of the main issues 
at stake. The second section describes the methods to be followed in order to assess efficiency 
on tertiary education provision across countries and its determinants and presents results from 
the application of semi-parametric and stochastic frontier methods. The third section is 
focused on the effectiveness of public spending on tertiary education. An annex contains three 
case studies, two concerning more efficient countries (the Netherlands, the UK) and one about 
a less efficient system (Portugal). Finally, the report ends with the conclusions that can be 
drawn from our study. 
  41. Concepts, data and preliminary analysis 
1.1 Concepts 
 
Definition of efficiency  
Efficiency is essentially a comparison between inputs used in a certain activity and produced 
outputs. When, with a given amount of inputs or resources, a decision making unit (DMU) – 
be it a company, a government body, or a country – attains that level of output or outputs that 
is the maximum attainable under the existing technology, that DMU is said to be efficient, 
i.e., it operates on the production possibility frontier. When it produces less than what can 
possibly be attained, the DMU is considered to be inefficient. 
 
FIGURE 1: THE PRODUCTION POSSIBILITY FRONTIER 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates these concepts in a simplified one input – one output framework. DMUs 
A, B, and C are located on the production possibility frontier, and are therefore efficient. On 
the other hand, DMU D is inefficient. With the level of input it uses it produces d1 units of 
output. Production should increase by d2 units if the possibility frontier were to be attained. A 
possible measure of DMU D’s inefficiency is the so-called output efficiency coefficient, 
(d1+d2)/d1, related to the vertical distance to the frontier. In a similar manner, it is possible to 
measure an input efficiency coefficient, associated to the horizontal distance to the frontier.  
 
A dual approach to efficiency measurement is adequate when more that one output is to be 
considered and the researcher uses a parametric method like stochastic frontier analysis. This 
dual approach implies the estimation of a cost frontier, instead of a production frontier. The 
cost frontier will be a function of outputs and of input costs. Inefficiency will in this case be 
  5evaluated as a measure of the excess cost each unit is incurring relative to minimum 
(efficient) cost.  
 
Applying these concepts to tertiary education entails defining the DMUs, characterizing 
inputs and outputs, and also developing a method or methods to estimate the production or 
cost frontiers, all points to be covered in what follows. 
 
The decision-making units 
One of the main objectives of the study is to compare the EU Member States and a country-
level analysis is envisaged. Accordingly, the DMU set includes the different public tertiary 
education systems, which roughly corresponds to all public instructional educational 
institutions of tertiary education across the EU (to be made precise below). Luxembourg was 
excluded as its only university was only established in 2003. Japan and the US are also taken 
in the analysis in order to gain more insight and to add statistical significance to the results. 
However, in practice, effective consideration of all these countries will depend on data 
availability. Countries to be considered in the study are listed in Table 1. 
 
         TABLE 1: COUNTRIES TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE STUDY 
Country Name  Country
Code 
Country Name  Country
Code 
Austria  AT  Italy  IT 
Belgium  BE  Japan  JP 
Bulgaria  BG  Lithuania  LT 
Cyprus  CY  Latvia  LV 
Czech Republic  CZ  Malta  MT 
Germany  DE  Netherlands  NL 
Denmark  DK  Poland  PL 
Estonia  EE  Portugal  PT 
Greece  EL  Romania  RO 
Spain  ES  Sweden  SE 
Finland  FI  Slovenia  SI 
France  FR  Slovak Republic  SK 
Hungary  HU  United Kingdom  UK 
Ireland  IE  United States  US 
 
Finally, note that Table 1 contains both small and large countries. In order to have a 
meaningful comparison, variables will usually be taken in per capita terms, i.e., divided by 
population.  
 
  6Public system vs. private system 
This study is integrated in the study of efficiency and effectiveness of public spending. As 
such, the institutions under analysis in each country are either public or government-
dependent private. These concepts, as defined in European Commission (2007), are: 
•  public institutions: institutions that are directly or indirectly administered by a public 
education authority; 
•  private government-dependent institutions: institutions that are directly or indirectly 
administered by a non-governmental organisation (church, trade union, a private business 
concern, or other body) and which, according to the definition in the UNESCO-
UIS/OECD/Eurostat (UOE) questionnaire, receive over 50% of their core funding from the 
public authorities; 
•  private independent institutions: institutions that are directly or indirectly administered 
by a non-governmental organisation (church, trade union, a private business concern, or 
other body) and which, according to the definition in the UOE questionnaire, receive less 
than 50% of their core funding from the public authorities. 
 
Table 2 summarises the structure of the tertiary education systems in each country under 
study. In ideal terms, one would like to include all public institutions, and weight each private 
government-dependent institution according to the percentage of funds it receives from public 
sources. Such detailed data is not available. As a matter of fact, it was not even possible to 
obtain a list of private government-dependent institutions per country. However, we could 
obtain lists of public and or private institutions per country. We have then considered in our 
sample: 
•  all institutions, when, in one given country, institutions are all either public or public 
and private government-dependent; 
•  public institutions only, when there are some private independent institutions. In these 
cases, private government-dependent institutions, if they exist, could not be 
considered, as it was not possible to disentangle them from the private independent 
institutions. This happened for France, Germany, and Spain; 
•  public and government-dependent institutions, when both are important, whereas 
independent private institutions are negligible. This is the case of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Slovenia. 
 
  7In what follows, we will refer to the institutions we have considered in each country, be it 
public only or both public and government-dependent, by PGD. 
TABLE 2: STRUCTURE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION SYSTEMS 








Austria  X X   All   
Belgium  X  X   All   
Bulgaria  X    X Public 
institutions 
 
Cyprus  X    X Public 
institutions 
 
Czech Republic  X    X Public 
institutions 
Some negligible private government-
dependent institutions exist. 
Denmark  X     All   
Estonia  X  X  X  Public and gov. 
dependent inst. 
Some negligible private institutions 
exist. 
Finland  X  X   All   
France  X  X  X Public 
institutions 
 
Germany  X  X  X Public 
institutions 
 
Greece  X     All   
Hungary  X  X   All   
Ireland  X    X Public 
institutions 
 
Italy  X    X Public 
institutions 
 
Japan  X    X Public 
institutions 
 
Latvia  X  X  X  Public and gov. 
dependent inst. 
 
Lithuania  X  X  X  Public and gov. 
dependent inst. 
Private universities are few and 
negligible.  
Malta  X     All   
Netherlands  X  X   All   
Poland  X  X  X Public 
institutions 
Some negligible private government-
dependent institutions exist. 
Portugal  X    X Public 
institutions 
 
Romania  X    X Public 
institutions 
 
Slovakia  X    X All  Some  negligible private institutions 
exist. 
Slovenia  X  X  X  Public and gov. 
dependent inst. 
Some negligible private government-
dependent institutions exist. 
Spain  X  X  X Public 
institutions 
Some negligible private government-
dependent institutions exist. 
Sweden  X  X   All   
United Kingdom  X  X   All   
United States  X    X Public 
institutions 
 
Source: OECD Online Education Database, complemented by inspection of government websites. 
 
Outputs and their measurement 
Tertiary educational systems are supposed to produce and disseminate knowledge, and this 
activity is pursued along two main dimensions: teaching and research. It is important 
  8therefore to properly define outputs that are at the same time measurable, not too numerous 
relative to the number of DMUs to be studied, and clearly related to teaching and research.  
 
As in other studies concerning the efficiency of universities, measures of the number of 
graduates will be considered as outputs of teaching activities.
2 Quality of teaching is to be 
measured by resorting to survey data. The THES (Times Higher Education Supplement) - QS 
(Quacquarelli Symonds) World University Rankings provide data on two important surveys.
3 
One concerns graduates' employability as perceived by recruiters and the other relates to 
quality perceptions among peers. These surveys provide scores on individual universities. In a 
process to be described later, we computed country scores from those original university 
scores and obtained a “recruiter view country indicator” and a “peer view country indicator.” 
These indicators will be used to scale the number of graduates in each country.  
 
Research output is to be evaluated by means of measures derived from the number of 
publications and their impact. We aggregate to country level the number of published papers 
in academic journals by considering the location of the authors’ affiliation. Furthermore, 
quality of such publications is taken into account by means of the number of citations 
received. In fact, in a manner to be made precise below, we have computed a citation index, 
which we then use to weight the number of publications. The Web of Science database 
elaborated by The Thomson Corporation is our source on this matter. 
 
Inputs and their measurement 
As in many studies on efficiency in education (see section 1.2), the number of full-time 
equivalent academic staff is the input considered. This category includes all personnel whose 
primary or major assignment is instruction or research (covering, namely, those holding an 
academic rank with such titles as professor, associate professor, assistant professor, instructor, 
lecturer, or the equivalent of any of these academic ranks). Ideally, we would also like to 
consider non-academic staff, whose main function is to administer students, teachers, and 
researchers and who facilitates the teaching and research process in general, as well as the 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Flegg et al. (2004). 
3 The Institute of Higher Education from the Shanghai Jiao Tong University also produces a well known world 
ranking of universities. We did not use data from that ranking because it would imply a double counting in what 
concerns publications and citations. On the other hand, the qualitative survey data we took from the THES-QS 
ranking is not superimposing to the information we collected from other sources. 
 
 
  9total time spent by students in order to have a degree, and some measure of the physical 
capital used (e.g., buildings and libraries). Nevertheless, such data is not available for most 
countries/years comprised in this study. 
 
The total number of students is the other input we included. Students are an input in so far as 
they constitute the essential resource used to produce one of the main tertiary education 
outputs – the number of graduates. Implicitly in our approach, students who do not achieve 
graduation are an indicator of waste in education, as time, labour, capital, and expectations 
were spent without a measurable outcome.
4  
 
Cost (money) measures 
In order to implement a multi-dimensional cost function model, we have to consider the total 
cost of the tertiary educational system. In one model,
5 we have considered wages in the 
services sector as a proxy for wages in tertiary education across countries, so we could have 
data for the whole sample. Other alternatives proved less adequate: 
  - Dividing staff costs by the number of full-time equivalents in the 
Unesco/OECD/Eurostat database was considered, but missing values are too numerous. 
  - The International Labour Organization (ILO) collects information on wages paid in 
the month of October to tertiary education teachers of mathematics or languages and 
literature, but we could not use it for several reasons: the data do not capture variation in the 
number of months paid each year, nor in employers’ social security contributions and missing 
values are very numerous. Moreover, the ILO makes very few adjustments to the national 
replies to the questionnaires provided.   
  - Eurostat has data on average annual gross earnings in education. However, apart 
from neglecting social security contributions paid by employers (and, of course, comprising 
non-tertiary education), this variable presents missing values in all years for more than half of 
the countries in our sample. Eurostat also has annual information on monthly labour costs in 
education, with somewhat better country coverage (only 5 EU members without any annual 
entries), though often with very short time spans (e.g., countries with data for only 2 or 3 
                                                 
4 As mentioned in section 1.2, some studies on university efficiency follow our approach (for example, Flegg et 
al., 2004). Others, however, consider the number of students as an output, rather than an input (for example, 
Abbott and Doucouliagos, 2003). We think there is an essential distinction between enrolled students as such, 
who are simply working to achieve a goal, and graduates, students who have achieved that goal. Assuming 
enrolled students as an output would result in a bias towards efficiency for those systems where drop out rates 
are high and we wish to consider this as a waste symptom. 
5 Wages were considered in the "alternative SFA model;" see Appendix E. 
  10years). We have checked that the available observations are highly correlated with our chosen 
proxy (even when “old” and “new” Member States are considered separately), which suggests 
that the use of the latter does not distort significantly the analysis. 
 
Exogenous and environment factors 
These are factors that potentially determine efficiency scores. In Figure 1, exogenous and 
environment factors explain in part why the DMU D is below the production possibility 
frontier. One could for example expect that under a less adverse environment DMU D could 
have been found producing d1c instead of d1. 
 
These variables are to be introduced in both efficiency measurement models to be used (two-
stage DEA and SFA), as explained in the proper sections. Here, we make reference to the 
most likely factors and corresponding variables that may be found to be significant: 
 
i) Universities’ organisation and funding schemes 
The way universities are organised is probably the first factor that comes to mind in what 
concerns explaining inefficiencies. We consider institutional indicators taken from Oliveira 
Martins et al. (2007). These authors constructed a composite indicator from a questionnaire in 
such a way that low values are associated to input rigidity, supply restrictions, and absence of 




ii) Quality of secondary education 
As in most countries the majority of the tertiary students have obtained their secondary 
degrees in that very same country, it is possible that better quality in secondary education 
affects efficiency in tertiary education. Examples of measures of secondary education quality 
are PISA scores, which we include here, and drop out rates. 
 
Definition of effectiveness and outcomes 
While efficiency derives from a relationship between inputs and outputs, and refers 
essentially to the extent to which outputs are attained while minimising production costs, 
effectiveness refers, in our view, to the connection between inputs, outputs and more general, 
                                                 
6The questionnaire used to build the composite indicator is available in Appendix C.  
  11second layer type objectives or outcomes. According to this preferred definition, while 
outputs from tertiary education are graduated students or published papers, outcomes to which 
these outputs in principle concur may be higher productivity, employability, innovation, or 
economic growth.   
 
Outcomes to be considered 
When considering effectiveness of tertiary education across countries, we will be asking the 
following questions: 
i) Are increasing tertiary education spending levels affecting in a positive way labour 
productivity or total factor productivity?  
ii) How does efficiency in tertiary education promote employability? Namely, does efficiency 
explain the gap between graduates’ unemployment rate and that of people with secondary 
education only?   
iii) And how does efficiency in spending affect the relationship between tertiary education 
spending and labour productivity? 
 
1.2 A literature survey 
 
Despite the long history in studying universities costs, it is only recently that it is taken into 
account the presence of inefficiency in university production. In fact, while previous work in 
general assumed that the university produces on the minimum-cost frontier, recent empirical 
analysis allows for inefficiencies using two main categories of methods, namely, DEA 
methods and SFA. 
 
The scope of most of these studies, with only a few exceptions, is limited to the higher 
education institutions of a single country and the approaches are varied. Firstly, the output of 
universities can be generally categorized into teaching and research. Some works focus only 
on one of these dimensions, while others cover both. Second, concerning the choice of 
outputs and inputs, there is no definitive study to guide the selection of these factors in 
educational application. Various variables have been employed as measures of teaching 
output. The number of degrees conferred, the number of graduates, or full-time equivalent 
student enrolment are the most common, with, eventually, a distinction between the 
undergraduate and the graduate level and arts and sciences. There is no reason why students 
  12should be considered a better measure than the number of graduates: degrees awarded neglect 
the education of those who attend but do not graduate, but measure completions and the level 
of accomplishment. McMillan and Datta (1998) use the full-time equivalent number of 
students. A study that uses the number of graduations as a measure of outcome is Abbott and 
Doucouliagos (2003), whereas Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997) employ the number of 
graduates; Johnes (2006) and Flegg et al. (2004) divide the number of degrees awarded in 
graduate and postgraduate degrees; Warning (2004) distinguishes between graduations in 
sciences and in social sciences. Adjustment for quality is rare, namely through peer 
evaluation, given the lack of consistent qualitative measures in higher education. Both Flegg 
et al. (2004) and Johnes (2006) aim at evaluating universities in the UK and use graduations 
weighted by degree classification. 
 
The means for estimating the value of the research output is not less controversial. It has been 
assessed by means of the number of patents obtained, as well as publications and citations 
(see Athanassopoulos and Shale, 1997, and Warning, 2004). An alternative approach is to use 
government or external research finance attracted by a university as a proxy for both quantity 
and quality of the research output, even though some argue that this may well be considered 
an output, instead of an input. This is the case of Abbott and Doucouliagos (2003), Flegg et 
al., or McMillan and Datta (1998). 
 
If there is no consensus on which output measures to use and, in many cases, output selection 
is driven by the availability of reliable data, inputs are more readily quantifiable. Since 
university inputs must be purchased, expenditure becomes an aggregate input measure (see 
Athanassopoulos and Shale, 1997). Faculty are typically incorporated in full-time equivalent 
numbers or as salary expenses. This may be extended to include all academic staff or even 
non-academic staff, again in numbers or costs. Abbott and Doucouliagos (2003), Johnes, 
2006, and Flegg et al., 2004 consider staff in numbers and Warning (2004) in costs. Other 
separately designated inputs are the full-time equivalent number of students (see Flegg et al., 
2004, and Johnes, 2006), expenditure on inputs other than labour inputs, and proxies for the 
university's capital stock. Johnes (2006) for instance, uses the value of interest payments and 
depreciation as a measure of the capital stock. 
 
All the aforementioned studies apply DEA to study efficiency in the higher education sector; 
other examples include Tomkins and Green (1988), Beasley (1990, 1995), Johnes and Johnes 
  13(1993), Sarrico et al. (1997), Sarrico and Dyson (2000). Among the few articles that apply 
SFA to higher education, we only mention two key studies, both concerning universities in 
the UK. Izadi et al. (2002) estimates a constant elasticity of scale (CES) cost frontier. The 
dependent variable is total expenditure and the independent variables are the number of 
undergraduate students in arts and in sciences, the number of graduate students, and the value 
of research grants received. Apart from these, Stevens (2005) also considers staff costs and, in 
order to account for the quality of the teaching output, the proportion of first-class degrees, 
while controlling for input quality by means of the average scores of students entering the 
university. 
 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, attempts to make efficiency analysis of the higher 
education sector at the international level are only a few. Joumady and Ris (2005) compare 
universities in 8 different countries (Italy, Spain, France, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, and Finland), using a large sample of recent higher education graduates 
responses to a survey conducted in 1998. Their aim is to evaluate the adequacy of the skills of 
recent graduates from different universities to the labour market requirements. Thus, they 
focus on teaching and define efficiency as the ability to, first, generate human capital 
competencies and, second, to match the competencies provided with the competencies 
required, and outputs are taken along these lines. Inputs are students' qualification and grade 
before enrolment in higher education, study conditions and teaching quality provision, and 
intensity of job search. By computing average efficiency scores, Joumady and Ris (2005) 
distinguishes between three groups of countries, namely the UK, Netherlands, and Austria, 
that have relatively good performance, France and Germany, that are located on an average 
level of inefficiency, and finally, Spain, Finland, and Italy, that exhibit the worst 
performances. 
 
Agasisti and Johnes (2007) use DEA to compare technical efficiency of English and Italian 
universities in the period 2002-3 to 2004-5. This study includes as outputs the number of 
graduates and the total amount of external grants and contracts for research, thus covering 
both dimensions - teaching and research. As inputs, they consider the total number of 
students, the total amount of financial resources/incomes, the number of PhD students, and 
the number of academic staff. By looking at the evolution of technical efficiency scores over 
the four-year period, Agasisti and Johnes (2007) conclude that whereas Italian universities are 
improving their technical efficiency, English universities are obtaining stable scores. 
  14Nevertheless, the typical English HE institution is measured as being much more efficient 
than its Italian counterpart. Finally, Agasisti (2008) is the only article that performs a cross-
country comparison using countries as decision-making units. It conducts a DEA on the HE 
sector of some European countries for the period 2000-2003, focusing on the teaching 
dimension only. Agasisti uses as outputs the population that has attained tertiary education, 
employment rates of graduates, and the percentage of foreign students. Inputs are the students 
to teachers ratio, entry rates, and expenditure on educational institutions. Agasisti then 
concludes that the UK has the best performance, essentially due to the high graduation rates 
experienced and the good results in terms of foreign students’ attraction. France, Germany, 
and Ireland also display good performances. The Nordic countries are characterized by 
relatively low efficiency scores given the extremely high levels of spending, while Eastern 
countries have both relatively low levels of spending and low performances, except for the 
Slovak Republic, which results as an efficient country. 
 
In what effectiveness is concerned, there is a vast literature studying the impact of education 
on economic growth, though many contributions do not disaggregate education by levels, so 
as to study the importance of tertiary education. Abundant research is also available on the 
link between education and labour market outcomes, though often drawing on micro data. 
Our survey of these strands of literature will be selective, and mainly guided by the approach 
taken in section 3 of this report. 
 
Some studies address the importance of education for output or productivity growth within 
the more general framework of the growth effects of fiscal policy, especially of public 
expenditure and its composition. From this perspective, one tests the explanatory power of 
public spending on education in a growth regression, controlling for other variables, such as 
capital accumulation, initial income levels or other budget items. Examples include 
Blankenau et al. (2007) and Devarajan et al. (1996). The latter study contains a detailed 
disaggregation of central government expenditure, including, among many other categories, 
tertiary education spending (for which no significant beneficial growth effects were found).
7   
 
                                                 
7 The sample period is 1970-1990 and the study draws on data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. In 
past issues of this source total education outlays were broken down into schools, universities and other spending, 
but this disaggregation has been discontinued. 
  15While the approach in the previous paragraph can be regarded as input-based, it is also 
possible to consider how education outputs contribute to economic growth. By far the most 
widely used output is average years of schooling, which is taken as a proxy for human capital 
and included in a production function alongside other production factors, such as labour and 
physical capital (see, e.g., De la Fuente and Domenech, 2006; Cohen and Soto, 2007). A few 
studies disaggregate total human capital by levels of education –e.g., Pereira and St. Aubyn 
(2008) or Vandenbussche et al. (2006), the latter study suggesting that the growth effects of 
tertiary education are stronger the closer economies are to the technological frontier. For the 
purposes of the present report, however, a disadvantage of this approach is that it neglects one 
of the main outputs of tertiary education, namely scientific research. 
 
It holds that in most countries and years schooling minimizes the risk of unemployment, and 
hence the unemployment rate among those with tertiary education attainment is smaller than 
among groups with lower levels of attainment (see, e.g., Blondal et al., 2002). On the basis of 
micro data (individual-level data from household surveys), Boarini and Strauss (2007) 
estimates for several countries the employability premium from tertiary education (relative to 
upper secondary education) controlling for other individual characteristics, and find an 
average value of roughly two percentage points. Biagi and Lucifora (2008) studies the impact 
of education on unemployment using data from Labour Force Surveys for 10 European 
countries, and conclude that, controlling for a host of other factors (e.g., demographic 
variables or the business cycle), higher educational attainment (measured by the share of 
those with more than primary education) reduces unemployment rates, both for less educated 
and (especially) for more educated groups. In section 3 of this report we intend to go one step 
further and investigate the determinants of cross-country variation in the employability 




Data on inputs, teaching outputs, and financial data were drawn from the OECD (Online 
Education Database) whenever possible to ensure data comparability across countries. Such 
data are available for the period 1998-2005 only, thus considerably restricting the scope of 
our study. Moreover, in order to derive consistent time series for the period considered, the 
  16OECD data were combined with other sources, notably Eurostat.
8 In what research outputs 
are concerned, the ISI Web of Science was the main source. Finally, indexes on the quality of 
teaching were drawn from THES (Times Higher Education Supplement), the institutional 
variables were taken from Oliveira Martins et al. (2007), and macroeconomic data from 
AMECO and Eurostat. Precise definitions of the variables used are given in what follows. 







Definition: Number of members of the academic staff (comprising all personnel whose 
primary or major assignment is instruction or research and so covers personnel who hold an 
academic rank with such titles as professor, associate professor, assistant professor, instructor, 
lecturer, or the equivalent of any of these academic ranks), working in both PGD institutions 
of tertiary education (including ISCED levels 5 and 6) in full-time units. 
 
Students in PGD Institutions:  
 
Definition: Number of students enrolled in PGD institutions of tertiary education (ISCED 




Total Expenditure on PGD Institutions in Percentage of GDP: 
 
Definition: Annual expenditure on PGD institutions in percentage of GDP at tertiary level of 
education (ISCED levels 5 and 6).  
 
                                                 
8 We think it is important to point out that UOE databases on education are incomplete, with a good number of 
missing figures and unclassified items. Apart from measurement errors, this conditioned our empirical work 
when it came to model specification and periods considered in a manner that will be clarified in the following 
parts of this report. 
  17Total Expenditure on PGD Institutions in Purchasing Power Standard in Real Terms Per 
Capita: 
 
This data has been constructed using the dataset Expenditure by nature and resource category 
from the UOE data collection. We have obtained the total current and capital expenditure for 
PGD institutions for the selected years. Originally data is measured in millions of national 
currency and, for the sake of comparison, we have transformed the data into purchasing 
power standard euros in real terms using the following formula: 
ti ti ti ti
ti
D PPS E Pop
TotExp 1 1 1
× × × , 
where   is the total current and capital expenditure in million of national currency for 
country i in year t;   is the total population; Eti is the ECU-EUR average exchange rates 
defined as units of national currency per EUR/ECU; PPSti is the ratio of GDP purchasing 
power parities over ECU/EUR exchange rates and, finally,  is the euro area price deflator 
of the gross domestic product at market prices of the year 2000. Data on , Eti, PPSti, and 







Total Public Expenditure on Tertiary Education 
 
Definition: Annual expenditure on tertiary education by all government levels, consisting of 
direct expenditures for educational institutions (public and private) plus transfers and 
payments to private entities (i.e., public spending outside educational institutions). 
 
Total Public Expenditure for Educational Institutions (Tertiary Education) 
 




Graduates in PGD Institutions:  
 
Definition:  Number of students who graduate in PGD institutions of tertiary education 
(ISCED levels 5, 6). 
  
  18THES - QS recruiter survey ranking: 
 
Definition: Classification of world universities according to results from a survey filled by 
recruiters from all over the world (2005, 2006, and 2007) and concerning the employability of 
graduates. 
 
THES - QS peer survey ranking: 
 
Definition: Classification of world universities according to results from a survey filled by 




Definition: Number of published articles in a given year with at least one author affiliated to a 
given country's institution and included in the ISI Web of Science database. The data 
collection methodology was the following. Firstly, we obtained a list of the PGD institutions 
for each country. Then, for each year and each country, we searched all publications for 
which at least one author was affiliated to an institution of that particular country. From these, 
we selected the publications from the universities belonging to the relevant list, i.e., the list of 
the PGD institutions. The ISI platform does not allow for searches in which the number of 
publications in one year exceeds 100 000. In cases where that situation arose, namely the US, 
we have split the search into the different states and then removed the papers that included 




Definition: Number of citations of articles published and cited within a five-year period with 
at least one author affiliated to a given country's institution and included in the ISI Web of 
Science database. The data collection was done as follows: after having obtained the list of 
relevant institutions in each country, we looked for the number of citations of papers 
published in a certain year in the five subsequent years, whenever possible. Whenever the 
number of publications of a country exceeded 10 000, in which case the ISI platform does not 
return any valid number, we partitioned that country’s set of institutions so as to obtain groups 
of institutions that publish at most 10 000 articles per year. We then obtained all citations for 
  19the publications of each group of institutions, excluding those already considered in a 
different group to avoid double-counting, and summed them up to obtain the number of 
citations of the country’s publications.   
 
Institutional and environment data 
 
Supply of tertiary education (STE) 
 
Definition: STE is a composite indicator of the institutional set-up of tertiary education, 
aggregating scores for input flexibility, output flexibility, and accountability.  
 
Input flexibility (IF):  
i) Selection of students: autonomy to choose the number of students and their profile. 
ii) Budget autonomy: autonomy to decide on the level of tuition fees and to raise other funds, 
as well as to decide on the structure of expenditure.  
iii) Staff policy: autonomy to hire, set the wages, and to dismiss the academic staff.  
 
Output flexibility (OF): 
Autonomy to set course content, to offer more diversified studies, and to decide on the 
(in)existence of constraints associated with numerus clausus. 
 
Accountability (Ac): 
i) Evaluation: presence of an independent evaluator, involvement of stakeholders in the 
evaluation process, and availability of public evaluation reports.  




Definition: PISA is an internationally standardised assessment that was jointly developed by 
participating countries and administered to 15-year-olds in schools. The survey was 
implemented in 43 countries in the first assessment in 2000, in 41 countries in the second 
assessment in 2003, and in 57 countries in the third assessment in 2006. Tests are typically 
administered to between 4 500 and 10 000 students in each country. We have considered the 
  20average of the PISA assessments on reading, mathematics, and science in year 2000 as a 
measure of the student preparation for university studies.  
 
1.3 Preliminary analysis 
FIGURE 2 
Expenditure on PGD Institutions of Higher 

























































































































































































Figure 2 expresses the total public expenditure on tertiary education institutions in percentage 
of GDP in 2005. It varies from 1.73% (Finland) to 0.49% (Japan). The average is 1.2%.
9  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the number of academic staff in PGD institutions relative to the total 
country population. This number varies between 3.7 (Sweden) and 0.8 (Japan). Romania has 
the lowest figure available for a EU country, 1.1.  Notice that Sweden and Finland have a very 
high number of academics per 1000 inhabitants whereas the UK is below average. Also 
striking are the cases of Bulgaria, Estonia, and Spain with values well above the average 
(2.0).  
                                                 
9 Note that, in total, the US expenditure on education is much higher than European countries’ expenditure, but 
this is mainly due to private funding. 
  21FIGURE 3 


























































































































































































































Figure 4 depicts the share of students in the tertiary education enrolled in PGD institutions. 
Note that the countries in which 100% of the students are enrolled in these tertiary education 
institutions are countries in which there are no private independent universities, or in which 
these institutions are very small (Austria). Observe that in the analysed countries the weight 
of the public sector in tertiary education is very high, except for Japan, in which only 21% of 
the students are enrolled in public tertiary education institutions.  
FIGURE 4 






































































































































































































  22The number of students in ISCED levels 5 and 6 per member of the academic staff is 
illustrated in Figure 5. Slovenia has a very high ratio of students per member of the academic 
staff (35), whereas Japan and Cyprus have a much lower ratio (7.8 and 5.4, respectively).   
FIGURE 5 

























































































































































































































In terms of graduations (Figure 6 and Figure 7) we observe that Ireland, Lithuania, and the 
UK have a good performance both in the number of graduates per 1000 inhabitants and per 
member of academic staff. We observe a high variance across countries (see Figure 7). The 
worst performances in Europe are from Austria, Germany, and Cyprus, with a very low 
number of graduates.  
  23FIGURE 6 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































Note that the indicator “graduates per academic staff” can be used to analyze the efficiency of 
the teaching system as graduates are one of the outputs of tertiary education and academic 
staff is one of the inputs. In Figure 7 we observe that, on average, the number of graduates per 
academic staff is between 3 and 4, but some countries can achieve twice this value. It will be 
interesting to compare the number of publications per academic staff and the number of 
  24graduates per academic staff given that these are the two outputs of the tertiary education 
system.  
 
Another important indicator is the graduation rate, defined as the percentage of graduates over 
the number of students in each period. It can be interpreted as a turnover rate of tertiary 

































































































































































































































The number of published articles is one possible measure of scientific production. This 
measure is plotted in Figure 9. Again, this number is divided by the population to scale the 
indicator.  
 


































































































































































































































Scientific production as measured by the indicator in Figure 9 is particularly high in the 
Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) and the Netherlands. Note that all these 
countries are above the US, the greater producer in absolute terms.  
 
It is possible to decompose the number of articles per capita in two other interesting 









× =  .    (1) 
 
Articles’ production per capita depends both on the academic staff productivity and on the 
relative importance of the academic staff respective to total population. As it will be shown in 
the following lines, this decomposition allows a deeper analysis of differences across 
countries. 
 












Austria  0.87 0.47 1.85 
Belgium  0.96 0.56 1.71 
Bulgaria  0.09 0.05 1.75 
Cyprus  0.24 0.15 1.57 
Czech Rep  0.30 0.21 1.47 
Estonia  0.50 0.19 2.65 
Finland  1.26 0.37 3.42 
France  0.34 0.19 1.76 
Germany  0.59 0.30 1.96 
Greece  0.54 0.28 1.91 
Hungary  0.31 0.15 2.10 
Ireland  0.78 0.34 2.31 
Italy  0.49 0.33 1.48 
Japan  0.40 0.48 0.83 
Latvia  0.10 0.07 1.48 
Lithuania  0.19 0.07 2.77 
Malta  0.14 0.08 1.67 
Netherlands  0.96 0.44 2.18 
Poland  0.24 0.11 2.16 
Portugal  0.42 0.21 2.02 
Romania  0.06 0.06 1.10 
Slovakia  0.20 0.10 2.05 
Slovenia  0.72 0.46 1.55 
Spain  0.49 0.20 2.47 
Sweden  1.52 0.42 3.66 
UK  0.92 0.59 1.55 
US  0.53 0.28 1.87 
 
Table 3 displays the aforementioned decomposition across countries in 2005. Some countries 
are not included due to missing data. The following observations apply: 
•  the countries with the highest production per capita (Finland and Sweden) are also 
countries with a large academic staff. Productivity of this academic staff is above 
average; 
•  some countries achieve above average production per capita (the Netherlands and the 
UK) essentially due to a high academic staff productivity, while displaying a smaller 
than average academic staff; 
•  a third group of countries, while employing an above average academic staff, produces 
below average.  This group includes Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, 
Poland, and Bulgaria; 
  27•  finally, some countries not only exhibit lower productivity, but also have a relatively 
small academic staff. This is the case of Romania, Latvia, Malta Cyprus, and Czech 
Republic. 
 
The number of times an article is cited by another article constitutes a usual measure of its 
impact. The average number of citations per article is one possible measure of the quality of a 
country’s scientific production.  We have computed a citation index based on the data 




















Cit Index , for t=1998,…,2001,    (2) 
where  cpubk represents the number of citations in year k and pubk is the number of 
publications in year k.  
 
Figure 10 exhibits the average of the Citation Indexes for the different periods. 
FIGURE 10 





























































































































































































































It is worth to highlight countries such as the Netherlands, the US, Finland, and Sweden, which 
not only produce a high number of publications, but also have a high impact in terms of 
citations.  Eastern European countries exhibit a weaker performance. 
  28 
Two other quality indicators, the peer review and the recruiter view country indicators, were 
constructed from the THES - QS World University Rankings database.  
 
The peer review country indicator intends to reflect each country’s presence in the 
universities’ ranking derived from the THES - QS peer survey. In order to compute a score 
for each country, we have considered only PGD universities and given points according to the 
following rule: 
•  2 points for each university between the 1st and the 100th position; 
•  1.5  points for each university between the 101st and the 200th position; 
•  1 point for each university between the 201st and the 300th position; 
•  0.5 points for each university between the 301st and the 400th position. 
We have then summed all the points corresponding to each country’s institutions and obtained 
a score per country. 
 
The peer review country indicator results from the adjustment of this score for country size, 
taking into account the weight of PGD institutions in tertiary education. To be precise, the 







education tertiary in students of number total
ns institutio PGD in students
population
score country
indicator country review peer
   






=+ .   (3) 
 
The recruiter review country indicator aims to reflect graduate employability. It is derived 
from the THES - QS recruiter survey. Its computation follows the same method as the peer 
review country indicator. 
 
  29In Figure 11 we plot the standardised recruiter review country indicator. Recruiters regard the 
Universities in Ireland and in the UK as providing highly employable graduates. On the other 
hand, Spanish, Polish, and Portuguese universities perform poorly on this strand. Other 
countries, for which the standardised recruiter review country indicator equals 1, do not have 
any university in the top 400. 
 
The standardised peer review country indicator is depicted in Figure 12. Considering their 
size, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden are the countries with more universities pointed out by 
peers as being excellent. Spain, Poland, and Greece also perform poorly on this indicator, but 
note should be taken that some countries were not included in the graphs because their score 
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FIGURE 12 








































































































































































































































































































































































The average of the PISA indicator is 496.6. The highest scores are attained by Japan, Finland, 
the UK, and the Netherlands. The US have a slightly above average score and the lowest 
scores belong to Greece, Portugal, and Romania.  
 
  31FIGURE 14 










































































































































Portugal performs extremely well in the Funding Rules indicator. The average of this 
indicator is 5. The worse performing countries are Romania and Slovakia. 


























































































































































Several countries attain the maximal value for the staff policy indicator, namely Austria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, the UK, and the US. 
The lowest score is for France followed by Hungary, Greece, and Spain.  
  32FIGURE 16 










































































































































Figure 16 exhibits the scores for the evaluation indicator. Hungary, the UK, and the 






In the estimation of the following sections we will use two composed variables: wgrad or 
weighted graduates, which reflects the number and quality of graduates, and wpub, a measure 
of the number of publications weighted by the number of citations. To be precise we have 






std peer rev ind std recruiter rev ind
wgrad graduates per pop
+
=×    (4) 
 
and  t () t wpub IndexCit t pub =× , where  () IndexCit t  is the average of citation indices that 
included year t in their construction.  
  33 
2. Efficiency Assessment 
 
We applied two different methods in order to measure efficiency in the provision of tertiary 
education and to identify the relevant non-discretionary (exogenous and environment) 
variables. Firstly we used a two-stage semi-parametric method, Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) followed by a regression of output scores on non-discretionary variables; and 
secondly, a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) method, including the estimation of a multi-
dimensional cost-minimising model with explanatory variables for the inefficiency effect. We 
turn now into an explanation of these two methods and the ensuing results.  
2.1 The semi-parametric analysis method 
 
The two-stage procedure can be briefly described in the following manner. 
 
In the first stage, the researcher identifies relevant inputs (X) and outputs (Y). Then, the 
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 .  (5) 
 
In problem (5), δi is a scalar satisfying  1 ≥ i δ . It measures technical efficiency of the i-th unit 
as the distance to the efficiency frontier, the latter being defined as a linear combination of 
best practice observations. With  1 > i δ , the decision unit is inside the frontier (i.e., it is 
inefficient), while  1 = i δ  implies that the decision unit is on the frontier (i.e., it is efficient). In 
what comes next, we will define   as the country i DEA output efficient score, which 
is necessarily greater then zero and no higher than 1. An interesting intuition is that 
1 −
i δ = i μ
i μ  is the 
  34fraction country i is producing of its potential efficiency level. It follows that  1 = i μ  when 
country i is efficient.  
 
This first stage is known as Data Envelopment Analysis, originating from Farrell (1957) 
seminal work and popularised by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). A full presentation of 
the method may be found in Coelli et al. (2005). Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005) have applied 
DEA to education and health efficiency across OECD countries.  
 
In the second stage, the following regression is estimated:  
 
  ii z i μβ ε =+ ,   (6) 
 
where  i μ  is the efficiency score that resulted from stage one, i.e., from solving (4). zi contains 
non-discretionary variables, i.e., exogenous and environment factors.  
 
Typical two-stage applications include the estimation of (6) using censored regression 
techniques (Tobit).
10 Recently, Simar and Wilson (2007) have criticised the two-stage 
method, as results are likely to be biased in small samples and propose an alternative 
estimation and inference procedures based on bootstrap methods. Afonso and St. Aubyn 
(2006) have applied both the Tobit and the Simar and Wilson bootstrap procedures in the 
second stage to estimate efficiency in secondary education across countries and contain a 
relatively detailed explanation of methods. Results from the two methods were very similar. 
In our study, we have used the Tobit estimation procedure only. 
 
When panel data is available, it becomes possible to apply DEA to more than one period. The 
researcher will then obtain as many efficiency scores as periods for each country. The mere 
comparison of those scores is informative as it shows whether a country became closer to or 
farther away from the efficiency frontier. However, one has to be aware that the frontier itself 
is usually not static. If that is the case, it becomes important to know if that frontier changed 
over time, and by how much. In fact, and after applying DEA in two different periods, the 
Malmquist index allows the decomposition of “total factor productivity change” (M) into 
“efficiency change” (E) and “technical change” (T): 
                                                 
10 See Simar and Wilson (2007) for an extensive list of published examples of the two step approach.  
  35 
i i i T E M × = .                                                        (7) 
 
In equation (7), Ei is given by the ratio of efficiency scores for country i, and Ti measures the 
change in the production possibility frontier in country i’s vicinity.
11  
2.2 Main results from the semi-parametric analysis 
 
The first stage (data envelopment analysis) 









(in per capita terms) 
Model DEA2: 
Spending in PGD institutions  
(in percentage of GDP) 
 
Weighted graduates 
Weighted published articles 
 








Table 4 summarises the variables used with this method.
12 We have considered two models, 
which are referred as model DEA1 and model DEA2. The output part of these models being 
exactly the same, they differ in what concerns the way inputs are measured.  
 
In model DEA1 we have considered academic staff and students as our inputs. Inputs  are 
therefore measured in physical units, which seems a natural way to measure and compare 
resources used across units (countries) that differ markedly in what concerns the cost of these 
resources (prices and wages). Note that it was not possible to collect data for other inputs. 
One envisaged possibility was to have a third input that would contain other resources used in 
the tertiary sector, in the manner of Flegg et al. (2004) when analysing British universities.
13  
                                                 
11 A more complete explanation of the Malmquist index can be found in Coelli et al. (2005). 
12 See Appendix A for data on inputs, some non-discretionary variables, and data used to construct the outputs.  
13 These authors included staff, students, and total expenditure other than that on academic and academic-related 
staff as inputs. See section 1.2 for more examples. 
  36However, this variable was scarcely available and the use of it would drastically reduce the 
number of countries in our sample. 
 
In model DEA2 we have considered a financial measure of outputs used. Considering 
nominal spending in PGD institutions has one advantage over using physically measured 
inputs, as virtually all costs are included. However, it carries also some drawbacks, as 
differences in costs across countries are controlled in an imperfect way. The widely used PPS 
correction (i.e., using the same acquisitive power euros across countries) is not enough when 
it comes to DEA. As wages are a very important part of tertiary education costs, countries 
where earnings are considerably lower would become artificially more efficient.
14 Measuring 
financial costs as percentage of GDP seems to be more suitable. It can be assumed as an 
approximation that any two countries that spend the same proportion of GDP on their tertiary 
education institutions use a comparable level of resources in this activity.
15 
 
In both models outputs are considered in per capita terms, in order to make it possible to 
compare countries that are very different in size (both Malta and the US are in the sample).   
 
Our two outputs, weighted graduates and weighted publications, reflect the double nature of 
tertiary institutions, which is education and research. As explained in section 1, graduates are 
weighted by quality inferred from the peer review and the recruiter review. Publications are 




It was not possible to compute weighted graduates, academic staff, and students per capita for 
all years and countries, due to missing data. However, and by dividing the whole time span in 
two sub-periods (1998-2001 and 2002-2005), it was possible to have values for those 
variables for all countries by averaging existing data.  
 
                                                 
14 A DEA model where PPS measured costs were considered as the input is presented in Appendix D. 
15 This approximation is more appropriate for activities where most inputs are nontradable across borders, as is 
the case of education.  
16 The consideration of these two types of output and weighting for quality is common in the literature on the 
efficiency of tertiary education institutions. As noted in section 1.2, examples of studies that consider both types 
of output are McMillan and Datta (1998), Flegg et al. (2004), and Stevens (2005), as well as references therein. 
Worthington (2001) surveys efficiency measurement techniques in education. 
  37Table 5 to 8 summarise results for the two sub-periods. They include the outputs, the inputs, 
and the efficiency scores. In both cases countries are ranked according to the latter. In Figure 
17 we display these rankings for both models.
17 Note that for each model we present two 
tables, one referring to an input-oriented DEA and the other to an output-oriented DEA. In an 
input oriented DEA, the efficiency coefficient refers to the horizontal distance to the frontier 
while in an output-oriented it relates to the vertical distance (see Figure 1). Efficient countries 
are the same under both orientations and their coefficient equals 1.  “Peers” are those efficient 
countries that dominate inefficient ones. For example, Austria in period 1 is worse than a 
linear combination of the Netherlands, UK and Japan production conditions, these latter 




TABLE 5: DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
MODEL DEA 1 (PHYSICALLY MEASURED INPUTS), INPUT ORIENTED 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coefficient Ranking  Peers  Coefficient Ranking Peers 
Austria  0.777  13  Netherlands, UK, Japan  0.963  9  Netherlands, Denmark, Japan 
Belgium  0.846  10  Japan UK  0.973  8  Denmark, UK, Japan 
Bulgaria  0.521 21  Japan,  Romania  0.517 21  Japan 
Cyprus  1.000 1  Cyprus  0.870  10  Japan 
Czech Republic  0.624 17  Japan,  Romania  0.618 18  Japan 
Denmark  0.816 11  Netherlands,  UK,  Japan  1.000  1  Denmark 
Estonia  0.411 27  Japan,  UK  0.360 28  UK,  Japan 
Finland  1.000 1  Finland  0.975 7  UK,  Ireland,  Sweden 
France  0.591 19  Japan,  UK  0.644 17  UK,  Japan 
Germany  0.643  15  Netherlands, UK ,Japan  0.644  16  Netherlands, Japan, Denmark 
Greece  0.598 18  Japan  Romania  0.511 22  Japan 
Hungary  0.488 23  Japan,  Romania  0.466 23  Japan,  UK 
Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland 
Italy  0.808 12  UK  ,Japan  0.685 12  UK,  Japan 
Japan  1.000 1  Japan  1.000 1  Japan 
Latvia  0.544 20  Japan,  Romania  0.668 13  Japan,  UK 
Lithuania  0.294 28  Japan,  UK  0.402 26  UK,  Japan 
Malta  0.639 16  Japan,  Romania  0.650 15  Japan 
Netherlands  1.000 1  Netherlands  1.000 1  Netherlands 
Poland  0.493 22  Japan,  UK  0.542 20  Japan  ,UK 
Portugal  0.461 25  Japan,  Romania  0.438 25  Japan 
Romania  1.000 1  Romania  0.840  11  Japan 
Slovakia  0.466 24  Japan,  Romania  0.448 24  UK,  Japan 
Slovenia  0.909 9  Romania,  Japan  0.664  14  Japan 
Spain  0.441 26  Japan,  Romania  0.389 27  Japan,  UK 
Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden 
United Kingdom  1.000 1  UK  1.000 1  UK 
United States  0.655 14  UK,  Japan  0.605 19  Japan,  UK 
 
                                                 
17 In Appendix D we present some results from alternative DEA models.  
  38TABLE 6: DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
MODEL DEA 1 (PHYSICALLY MEASURED INPUTS), OUTPUT ORIENTED 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coefficient Ranking  Peers  Coefficient Ranking Peers 
Austria  0.761  11  Netherlands, UK  0.962  9  Denmark, Japan, Netherlands
Belgium  0.839  10  Netherlands, UK  0.972  8  Denmark, Japan, UK 
Bulgaria  0.313 26  Ireland,  Japan,  UK  0.343 25  Ireland,  Japan,  UK 
Cyprus  1.000 1  Cyprus  0.277  28  Japan,  Sweden 
Czech Republic  0.298 27  Ireland,  Japan,  UK  0.352 23  Ireland,  Japan,  UK 
Denmark  0.874  9  Netherlands, Sweden, UK  1.000  1  Denmark 
Estonia  0.460 17  Ireland,  Japan,  UK  0.366 22  Ireland,  Japan,  UK 
Finland  1.000 1  Finland  0.996 7  Ireland,  Sweden,  UK 
France  0.566 16  Ireland,  Japan,  UK  0.599 11  Ireland,  Japan,  UK 
Germany  0.649  12  Japan, Netherlands, Sweden 0.660  10  Japan, Netherlands, Sweden 
Greece  0.273 28  Japan,  UK  0.294 27  Ireland,  Sweden,  UK 
Hungary  0.323 24  Ireland,  Japan  0.333 26  Ireland,  Japan,  UK 
Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland 
Italy  0.627 13  Japan,  UK  0.506 14  Japan,  UK 
Japan  1.000 1  Japan  1.000 1  Japan 
Latvia  0.346 23  Ireland,  Japan,  UK  0.469 17  Japan,  UK 
Lithuania  0.368 21  Ireland,  Japan  0.398 19  Ireland 
Malta  0.429 19  Ireland,  Japan  0.480 16  Ireland,  Japan,  UK 
Netherlands  1.000 1  Netherlands  1.000 1  Netherlands, 
Poland  0.431 18  Ireland,  Japan  0.482 15  Ireland,  Japan,  UK 
Portugal  0.365 22  Ireland,  Japan,  UK  0.376 21  Ireland,  Japan,  UK 
Romania  1.000 1  Romania  0.545  13  Japan,  UK 
Slovakia  0.316 25  Ireland,  Japan  0.346 24  Ireland,  Japan 
Slovenia  0.593 15  Japan,  UK  0.414 18  Japan,  UK 
Spain  0.382 20  Finland,  Ireland,  UK  0.382 20  Ireland,  Japan,  UK 
Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden 
United Kingdom  1.000 1  UK  1.000 1  UK 
United States  0.598 14  Netherlands,  UK  0.550 12  Denmark,  UK 
 
  39TABLE 7: DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
MODEL DEA 2 (FINANCIALLY MEASURED INPUTS), INPUT ORIENTED 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coefficient Ranking  Peers  Coefficient Ranking  Peers 
Austria  0.707  10  UK, Japan  0.904  6  Sweden, Japan 
Belgium  0.844  8  UK, Japan  0.876  8  Sweden, UK, Japan 
Bulgaria  0.426 24  Japan  0.486  20  Japan 
Czech Republic  0.605 14  Japan  0.531  17  Japan 
Denmark  0.656  11  Netherlands, UK  0.733  10  Sweden, UK, Japan 
Estonia  0.519  18  Ireland, Japan  0.551  15  Ireland, Japan 
Finland  1.000 1  Finland  0.904  7  Sweden,  UK,  Ireland 
France  0.617  12  Ireland, Japan  0.579  13  Ireland, Japan 
Germany  0.724  9  UK, Japan  0.716  11  Sweden, Japan 
Greece  0.516 19  Japan  0.423  24  Japan 
Hungary  0.467 23  Japan  0.471  22  Ireland,  Japan 
Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland  1.000  1  Ireland 
Italy  0.610 13  Japan,  UK  0.618  12  Sweden,  Japan 
Japan  1.000 1  Japan  1.000  1  Japan 
Lithuania  0.529  17  Ireland, Japan  0.542  16  Ireland, Japan 
Malta  0.860 7  Japan  0.867  9  Japan 
Netherlands  1.000 1  Netherlands  0.994  5  Sweden,  UK,  Japan 
Poland  0.553  16  Ireland, Japan  0.502  19  Ireland, Japan 
Portugal  0.490 22  Japan  0.486  21  Japan 
Slovakia  0.598 15  Japan  0.564  14  Ireland,  Japan 
Slovenia  0.371 25  Japan  0.394  25  Japan 
Spain  0.490 21  Japan  0.525  18  Ireland,  Japan 
Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden  1.000  1  Sweden 
United Kingdom  1.000 1  UK  1.000  1  UK 
United States  0.492  20  UK, Japan  0.440  23  Sweden, Japan, UK 
  40TABLE 8: DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
MODEL DEA2 (FINANCIALLY MEASURED INPUTS), OUTPUT ORIENTED 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coefficient Ranking  Peers  Coefficient Ranking  Peers 
Austria  0.694 9  Sweden,  Netherlands  0.886  8  Sweden,  Japan 
Belgium  0.826 7 
Netherlands, UK, 
Finland 0.858  9  Sweden,  UK,  Japan 
Bulgaria  0.284  23  Ireland, Japan  0.233  25  Ireland, Japan 
Czech Republic  0.313  22  Ireland, Japan  0.282  24  UK, Ireland, Japan 
Denmark  0.754  8  Finland, Ireland, UK  0.897  7  Ireland, Sweden 
Estonia  0.465  17  UK, Ireland, Japan  0.407  16  Japan, UK, Ireland 
Finland  1.000 1  Finland  0.995  5  Sweden,  Ireland 
France  0.579  12  UK, Ireland, Japan  0.451  14  Japan, UK, Ireland 
Germany  0.664  10  UK, Japan  0.658  11  Sweden, Japan 
Greece  0.280  24  Japan, UK, Ireland  0.289  23  Sweden, UK, Ireland 
Hungary  0.330  21  Ireland, Japan  0.306  22  Sweden, UK, Ireland 
Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland  1.000  1  Ireland 
Italy  0.509  13  UK, Japan  0.536  12  Sweden, UK, Japan 
Japan  1.000 1  Japan  1.000  1  Japan 
Lithuania  0.467 16  Ireland,  Japan  0.398  17  Ireland 
Malta  0.597  11  Ireland, Japan  0.698  10  Ireland, Japan 
Netherlands  1.000 1  Netherlands  0.993  6  Sweden,  UK,  Japan 
Poland  0.495 15  Ireland,  Japan  0.395  18  Ireland 
Portugal  0.337  20  UK, Ireland, Japan  0.310  21  Japan, UK, Ireland 
Slovakia  0.371  19  Ireland, Japan  0.336  19  Ireland, Japan 
Slovenia  0.273  25  Finland, Ireland, UK  0.315  20  Sweden, UK, Ireland 
Spain  0.439  18  Japan, UK, Ireland  0.417  15  UK, Ireland, Japan 
Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden  1.000  1  Sweden 
United 
Kingdom  1.000 1  UK  1.000  1  UK 
United States  0.498 14 
UK, Finland, 
Netherlands 0.484  13  Ireland,  Sweden 
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The following remarks apply to these first stage results: 
•  efficiency scores are very similar in both periods. Only a couple of countries changed 
their position in a striking manner, like Romania and Cyprus in the output oriented 
DEA1 model. In fact, Cyprus is in technical terms efficient by default in that model - 
it is not a peer of any other country. This means that although no country is found to 
be more efficient than Cyprus, it is also the case that Cyprus is not found to be more 
efficient than any other country. This status is completely altered in period 2. Romania 
is an almost efficient by default country in period 2. Even if it appears as peer of some 
other countries, the fact is that withdrawing Romania from the sample does not alter 
efficiency coefficients for other countries (see Appendix D).  
•  Ireland, Japan, Sweden, the UK, and the Netherlands were the countries to be found 
always at the production possibility frontier (or very close to it). In some cases this 
was essentially due to excellent scientific production (Sweden, Finland, and the 
Netherlands), whereas Ireland attained its position due to the graduation output, which 
is not only high in number but also the best in perceived quality (see section 1). The 
UK is a very good achiever on both counts (education and research) using a 
comparatively small number of resources (academic staff is below average). 
•  in contrast, another group of countries appears as highly inefficient.  Bulgaria, Spain, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Portugal, and Greece display usually 
low scores. Some of these countries have more tertiary students than average (Spain, 
  42Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, and Greece). However, these students seem to take a long 
time to graduate, or an important number of them do not conclude graduation. In all 
these countries, graduation output is considerably below average. Moreover, and even 
if academic staff is not too low and sometimes clearly above average (Estonia, Spain), 
scientific production is low in quantity and quality;  
•  some of the bigger EU countries (France, Germany, and Italy) are located well below 
efficiency levels. In the case of Germany, this is due to a small number of graduations 
compared to the average country. This is also the most important Italian weakness. As 
far as France is concerned, scientific production is comparatively low, while 
graduations are above average; 
•  the US also come out as quite inefficient. Still, we remind the reader that we are 
considering the public sector only and private institutions are important in this 
country. The academic staff for this country is below average. However, the number 
of enrolled students is high and above average, and, on the other hand, graduations are 
not impressive. Scientific production is slightly above average, but clearly below 
levels that characterize more productive countries in this matter (the UK and the 
Nordic countries). Again, one should note that some of the more research-oriented US 
universities, being private, were not considered in this study.  
 
Changes over time  
 
In Tables 9 and 10, we compare the two considered periods by displaying the Malmquist 
index decomposition. Observation of the “average” figures (final row of the table) lets us 
conclude that changes over time in total factor productivity (+12.8 percent in DEA1 and 
+16.5 percent in DEA2) was substantial and essentially derived from technical change (+22.4 
percent) in DEA2 rather than from efficiency changes, while in model DEA1 technical and 
efficiency changes seem to contribute evenly for total factor productivity. Some countries, 
like Austria and Denmark, approached efficiency levels in a significant way in both models. 
Austria reduced the academic staff and the number of students, without worsening the 
scientific production and only slightly reducing the number of weighted graduates. Denmark 




  43Almost all countries benefited from technical change, as can be inferred from Tables 9 and 
10, where the corresponding index is almost always greater than 1. This index corresponds to 
an expanding production possibility frontier. These expanded possibilities affect countries 
differently, as we did not impose constant returns to scale.  
TABLE 9: DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS: MALMQUIST DECOMPOSITION 
 (2005-2002 COMPARED TO 1998-2001) 



























Romania 0.545  2.837  1.547  1.048  1.621 
Latvia 1.355  0.994  1.347  1.072  1.444 
Austria 1.264  1.008  1.275  1.081  1.379 
Denmark 1.144  1.079  1.235  1.098  1.356 
Lithuania 1.084  1.255  1.360  0.984  1.338 
Belgium 1.159  1.011  1.172  1.119  1.312 
Czech Republic  1.180  0.991 1.169  1.040 1.215 
Slovakia 1.094  1.116  1.221  0.995  1.215 
Poland 1.120  1.053  1.179  1.007  1.187 
France 1.058  1.059  1.120  1.029  1.153 
Germany 1.016  1.011  1.027  1.105  1.135 
United Kingdom  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.126  1.126 
Sweden 1.000  1.017  1.017  1.104  1.123 
Malta 1.119  1.010  1.130  0.994  1.122 
Bulgaria 1.096  0.995  1.090  1.011  1.102 
Greece 1.074  0.904  0.971 1.134 1.102 
Italy 0.806  1.191  0.960  1.140  1.094 
Hungary 1.031  1.028  1.060  1.029  1.091 
Netherlands 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.074  1.074 
Japan 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.042  1.042 
Finland 0.996  0.946  0.942  1.098  1.035 
Portugal 1.032  1.005  1.037  0.998  1.035 
Ireland 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.014  1.014 
Spain 0.999  0.956  0.955  1.048  1.002 
United States  0.920  0.966  0.889  1.119  0.994 
Slovenia 0.699  1.207  0.843  1.140  0.961 
Cyprus 0.277  2.536  0.701  1.188  0.834 
Estonia 0.796  1.051  0.837  0.997  0.834 
average 0.961  1.103  1.060  1.064  1.128 
 
  44TABLE 10: DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS: MALMQUIST DECOMPOSITION 
 (2005-2002 COMPARED TO 1998-2001) 



























Austria 1.278  0.976  1.248  1.173  1.464 
Ireland 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.412  1.412 
Slovenia 1.155  1.088  1.256  1.103  1.385 
Sweden 1.000  1.091  1.091  1.171  1.277 
Denmark 1.189  0.941  1.118  1.124  1.257 
Hungary 0.926  1.003  0.929  1.352  1.256 
Slovakia 0.905  0.974  0.881  1.402  1.235 
Italy 1.053  1.007  1.060  1.125  1.192 
Czech Republic  0.903  1.007 0.910  1.304 1.187 
Malta 1.169  0.720  0.842  1.407  1.184 
Lithuania 0.853  0.989  0.843  1.402  1.182 
Belgium 1.039  1.003  1.042  1.108  1.155 
Greece 1.032  0.965  0.996 1.159 1.154 
Finland 0.995  1.017  1.012  1.135  1.148 
Portugal 0.917  1.003  0.921  1.242  1.143 
Bulgaria 0.820  0.988  0.810  1.402  1.135 
Netherlands 0.993  0.976  0.969 1.144 1.108 
Germany 0.991  0.975  0.966  1.145  1.106 
Estonia 0.873  0.992  0.866  1.271  1.101 
United Kingdom  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.076  1.076 
Spain 0.950  0.991  0.941  1.141  1.074 
France 0.780  1.010  0.788  1.309  1.031 
Poland 0.798  0.917  0.731  1.402  1.025 
Japan 1.000  0.887  0.887  1.118  0.992 
United States  0.972  0.911  0.886  1.117  0.990 
average 0.977  0.975  0.952  1.224  1.165 
 
 
The second stage (explaining inefficiency) 
 
Table 4 included all variables that we selected and that could probably have an influence on 
output scores. They were already described in section 1. They are seven in total.  
 
Six of them refer to institutional characteristics of the tertiary education system (selection of 
students, budget autonomy, staff policy, output flexibility, evaluation, and funding rules). 
Recall that these are qualitative variables, such that a high score (close to the maximum of 10) 
reflects more intensity on that particular characteristic. The minimum score is 0.  
 
  45PISA is a variable containing the average score of students from a given country in the PISA 
2000 exercise. This variable intends to reflect quality and knowledge skills of secondary 
students. The a priori is that more qualified secondary students will enhance efficiency in the 
tertiary system, as they are less prone to give up studying or to take more years than normal at 
university.  
TABLE 11: TOBIT REGRESSION OF DEA1 COEFFICIENTS ON EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
  two period average input coefficients two period average output coefficients
  Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-ratio  Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-ratio 
    
Constant -1.549  0.7672  -2.019  -2.286  0.7341  -3.114 
PISA   0.004089  0.001584  2.582  0.005448  0.001526  3.571 
Staff policy  0.03996  0.01815  2.201  0.03364  0.01808  1.861 
      
Adjusted R-squared  0.2731  0.5034 
Number of observations  20  20 
Left censored observations   0  0 
Right censored observations 5  5 
Mean dependent variable  0.7563  0.6822 





Table 11 includes results from the Tobit regression of DEA1 coefficients on the above-
mentioned set of explanatory variables (see equation (4)). Only 20 countries were included in 
the regression.
18 Non-significant variables were excluded from the final specification. 
Inspection of Table 11 allows us to conclude that: 
•  the PISA variable is highly significant, as seen by the very high t-statistic. Education 
quality, as proxied by PISA results, is an important explanatory factor when it comes 
to explain inefficiency; 
•  the way staff policy is conducted is also significant. The ability to hire and dismiss 
academic staff and to set wages increases efficiency. 
                                                 
18 As mentioned in section 1, we only had explanatory variables data for Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
  46TABLE 12: TOBIT REGRESSION OF DEA2 COEFFICIENTS ON EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
   two period average input 
coefficients 
two period average output 
coefficients 
   Coefficient Standard
Error 
t-ratio  Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-ratio 
        
Constant -3.4119  0.5865  -5.817  -4.972  0.6867  -7.240 
Funding rules  0.04835  0.02392  2.021  0.0756  0.02796  2.704 
Output flexibility  -0.03816  0.01935  -1.972  -0.05803  0.02264  -2.563 
PISA   0.007866  0.001266  6.211  0.01069  0.001482  7.213 
Staff policy  0.02837  0.01115  2.544  0.03907  0.01304  2.998 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.7302  0.7964 
Number of observations  19  19 




Mean dependent variable  0.7258  0.6658 


















Table 12 displays results from a Tobit regression of DEA2 coefficients on the significant 
explanatory variables. Along with PISA and staff policy, funding rules for institutions also 
affect efficiency. Moreover, output flexibility appears to have a negative effect on efficiency, 
as if greater diversity in supplied courses and degrees were more costly.  
 
2.3 More results from the semi-parametric analysis: the "research" and the "teaching" models 
 
It is well known that in DEA models with more than one output a unit may be efficient when 
it excels in one dimension even if it is below average in others. We have considered restricted 
versions of our DEA models where we have only one output, either weighted graduates (the 
"teaching model") or weighted publications (the "research model"). More detailed results are 
presented in Appendix D. Here, we refer to Figure 18, where output efficiency scores are 
compared for both models considering physically measured inputs. 
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The UK is efficient on both accounts, and is represented by a point in the top right corner of 
the graph. Countries like Slovenia, Spain, or Greece have similar scores in both models. Some 
countries, however, are clearly located to the right and below the straight thick line. These 
countries are more efficient if teaching is considered than in what concerns research. Ireland 
and France are in this group, as all Eastern European countries except Slovenia. On the other 
hand, the Nordic countries, Austria, and Belgium are clearly more efficient in research than in 
teaching, as they are above and to the left of the straight line that equalizes scores in both 
models.  
 
2.4 The stochastic frontier method  
 
The multi-dimensional cost-minimising approach proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) is 
also explained by Coelli et al. (2005). The reader may refer to Stevens (2005) for an 
application to universities, as mentioned in section 1.2. 
 
Accounting for multiple outputs within a stochastic frontier analysis usually implies resorting 
to dual methods, i.e., the direct estimation of a frontier production function is replaced by a 
cost minimisation problem (see Coelli et al., 2005).  
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Assume the following stochastic cost frontier: 
 
01 2 ln ln ln it it it it it c wpub wgrad ββ β ηε =+ + ++ ,                             (8) 
 
where i indexes a country, and t indexes time (years) and: 
•  cit is the total cost with PGD institutions in country i, measured as a percentage of 
GDP; 
•  wgradit, one of the considered outputs, are student graduations weighted by quality 
and per capita; 
•  wpubit, the other output, are publications weighted by citations per capita. 
 
In equation (8),   is a normally distributed random error, while  i ε i η  stands for a non-negative 
inefficiency effect, assumed to have a truncated normal distribution. Variables are in log form 
and estimated parameters are therefore elasticities.
19 
 
As in the two-stage semi-parametric procedure, inefficiency effects are to be explained by 
nondiscretionary factors represented by zi: 
 
01 1 ... it m m it zz η θθ θ η =+ + + +,                                                         (9) 
 
where the z’s are filled by variables mentioned in Table 13, which sums up variables used 
with this method. All variables were described in section 1, and already used in section 2, but 
here we take annual frequencies.  
                                                 
19 An alternative stochastic frontier model is presented in Appendix E. The dependent variable is the total cost 
with PDG institutions measured in real purchasing power standards euros per capita. Considering this variable 
calls for the introduction of wages as an explanatory variable and it was not possible to find a good proxy for 
wages in tertiary education, as explained in section 1. This alternative approach leads to less convincing results. 
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TABLE 13: DEPENDENT VARIABLES IN THE COST-MINIMISING MODEL 
Input prices  Outputs  Non-Discretionary Variables 













Estimation of equation (8) produces estimates for the following parameters of interest: 
•  the βs, the coefficients associated to the outputs; 
•  the θs, coefficients associated to nondiscretionary factors that explain inefficiency; 












 it is possible to produce a likelihood ratio (LR) statistic to test 
0 γ =
0
. This LR statistic has a mixed chi-square distribution (see Coelli, 1996). Note that 
γ =  would imply there were no random inefficiency effects.  
 
Moreover, these estimates make it possible to recover the implied annual efficiency 
coefficients for each country.  
 
2.5 Results from the stochastic frontier analysis 
The model just described was estimated by maximum likelihood using the software Frontier, 
version 4.1c.20 The parsimonious selected model, which we call "SFA" is described in Table 
14.  
 
                                                 
20 This software was written by Tim Coelli and is freely available online from the site 
http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/cepa/frontier.htm. 
 
  50TABLE 14: SFA ESTIMATION RESULTS 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: COST IN PERCENTAGE OF GDP) 
  Coefficient Standard-Error  t-ratio 
Cost function:   
constant  -1.194    36.37  -0.03283 
lwgrad 0.2581    0.04353  5.929 
lwpub  0.2707  0.02717    9.961 
Inefficiency:     
constant 4.843  36.35      0.1332 
staff policy  -0.01002    0.007332  -1.367 
evaluation -0.03954      0.01373  -2.880 
funding rules  -0.06146    0.01816  -3.394 
PISA2000  -0.007158    0.009246  -7.742 
  
2 ˆε σ   0.03601    0.004052    8.888 
γ  0.09920       
 
LR statistic (γ=0) 59.67    
 
 
We start by noting that the inefficiency component of the model is highly significant. The LR 
statistic equals 59.67, and clearly exceeds the critical value at 0.1 percent for a mixed chi-
square distribution with 6 degrees of freedom (which is 21.666, according to the tabulation of 
Kodde and Palm, 1986). 
 
The cost elasticities of each output, weighted graduations and weighted publications, are 
equal to 0.2581 and 0.2707, respectively.  
 
Three institutional variables were found to influence efficiency: staff policy, evaluation, and 
funding rules. All affect negatively the costs and hence increase efficiency as can be noticed 
by the negative coefficients. Moreover, results from the secondary education system as given 
by PISA scores were also important for the efficiency performance at tertiary level.
21 
 
Table 15 displays efficiency scores implied by the SFA model. These were computed as the 
ratio between the total cost under efficiency conditions and total observed cost.
22 The 
                                                 
21 Staff policy is the least significant among all explanatory variables. Withdrawing it led to less reliable 
estimated efficiency scores. Main results from a variant without staff policy are presented in Appendix E. 
22 It is more common in the SFA literature to compute efficiency scores as the inverse of those displayed in 
Table 15, i.e., as a ratio between total observed cost and cost under efficiency conditions. These coefficients 
would be comprised between 1 and infinity. Our transformation ensures some comparability to DEA efficiency 
scores, as our SFA scores also vary between 0 and 1.  
  51efficiency frontier is achieved when the score equals 1, and a country is less efficient when its 
score is further from 1 and closer to 0. 
TABLE 15: SFA, EFFICIENCY SCORES 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average Ranking 
(average) 
United Kingdom  0.730 0.733 0.738 0.737 0.734 0.737  na  na  0.735  1 
Japan  0.725 0.720 0.718 0.720 0.721 0.714 0.712 0.720  0.719  2 
Netherlands  0.687 0.681 0.683 0.682 0.684 0.683 0.685 0.687  0.684  3 
Finland  0.679 0.675 0.678 0.679 0.678 0.678 0.678 0.680  0.678  4 
Ireland  0.625 0.624 0.622 0.632 0.637 0.645 0.647 0.650  0.635  5 
Austria  0.573 0.568 0.585 0.588 0.586 0.592 0.590 0.588  0.584  6 
Sweden  0.576 0.578 0.579 0.580 0.580 0.580 0.583 0.588  0.581  7 
Belgium  na  na  0.571 0.569 0.571 0.574 0.578 0.580  0.574  8 
France  0.562 0.563 0.565 0.566 0.567 0.559 0.559 0.562  0.563  9 
Czech Republic  0.505 0.507 0.509 0.509 0.508 0.507 0.509 0.511  0.508  10 
Germany  0.508 0.509 0.509 0.509 0.507 0.504 0.507 0.509  0.508  11 
Denmark  na  0.504 0.506 0.502 0.500 0.507 0.508 0.512  0.506  12 
United States  0.494 0.493 0.493 0.488 0.486 0.485 0.492 0.492  0.491  13 
Spain  0.473 0.475 0.473 0.473 0.473 0.473 0.475 0.477  0.474  14 
Hungary  0.466 0.468 0.471 0.474 0.471 0.470 0.480 0.482  0.473  15 
Italy  0.463 0.460 0.461 0.459 0.459 0.460 0.470 0.470  0.463  16 
Portugal  0.425 0.427 0.429 0.428 0.433 0.430  na  na  0.429  17 
Slovakia  na  0.422 0.424 0.421 0.423 0.423 0.418 0.425  0.422  18 
Greece  na na na  0.326  0.325  na  0.323  0.323  0.324  19 
 
 
Due to missing data, some scores are not available for some countries and years.
23 Countries 
are ranked from the more efficient (the UK) to the less efficient (Greece), according to the 
average scores presented in the last column. In general terms, country positions do not vary 
much across time. The UK was always the efficiency leader, followed by Japan, the 
Netherlands, Finland, and Ireland. Greece remained always in the last place. Four of the more 
populous states in the EU, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain were always far from the 
efficiency frontier, with scores not revealing an increasing tendency.  
 
2.6 A summary of efficiency results 
 
We have evaluated efficiency across countries resorting to two different methodologies. It is 
worth stressing those differences before we engage in a comparison of results: 
                                                 
23 The estimation method allows for an unbalanced panel of data. 
  52•  DEA is a nonparametric method. The a priori assumptions about the production 
possibility frontier shape are kept to a minimum. These are convexity and variable 
returns to scale. On the other hand, SFA is a regression method and a good number of 
parameters are estimated. Namely, this implies an a priori choice of a functional form 
for the cost function. In our DEA estimates, we were agnostic till the end about the 
outputs relative importance.  As a consequence, a country that excels in one type of 
production (e.g., publications) but is less fruitful in the other type (e.g., graduations) 
may well appear as efficient under DEA. However, it may well fall in SFA rankings, 
as this method considers both outputs with a relative importance implicit in the 
regression estimated coefficients; 
•  We followed a production approach when applying DEA while we resorted to a cost 
minimisation framework when using SFA. Our DEA models were essentially a 
relationship between inputs and outputs, either measured in physical or monetary 
terms. When it came to SFA, we considered cost with tertiary education institutions as 
the dependent variable in a regression and outputs as explanatory variables. This 
different formulation, by itself, may induce dissimilar results. 
•  DEA is a first step of what is properly designated as a two-stage semi-parametric 
approach. In a second stage, scores previously obtained are regressed on conditioning 
factors. The SFA approach differs in this respect as it implies only one step. While in 
the DEA first stage typically more than one country is found at the production 
possibility frontier, this is rarely the case with SFA.  
•  The SFA maximum likelihood estimation method allows for an unbalanced panel, 
while for DEA calculations it is necessary to have a complete panel. We could 
therefore consider annual data for SFA, while we had to consider averaged data along 
more than one year with DEA. On the other side of the coin, we could include all 
countries in the DEA estimations (first step), while a smaller number only could be 
considered with SFA, due to missing data on environmental and institutional 
variables. 
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DEA and SFA rankings 










Country rankings derived from DEA2 and SFA are compared in Figure 19. Countries were 
ordered from the more efficient to the less efficient on both accounts, excluding those for 
which there were DEA estimates only. We considered the average scores across all years.  
 
Visually, one observes that rankings are correlated – countries that perform with SFA tend to 
be those well classified with DEA, as is the case with the UK (first on both accounts), Japan, 
the Netherlands and Ireland. Also, those that perform poorly essentially coincide – Portugal, 
Greece, or Hungary. 
 
Last but not least, there is one striking and important similarity between the two approaches. 
Environmental and institutional factors that explain efficiency essentially coincide. These 
factors are: 
- the quality of secondary education, as proxied by the PISA results; 
  - the nature of funding rules; 
  - staff policy and; 
























  543. Effectiveness Assessment 
3.1 The effectiveness assessment approach 
 
At stated previously, effectiveness differs from efficiency as it refers to a relationship between 
tertiary education and second layer goals or outcomes, for which we consider two 
possibilities: aggregate labour productivity and graduates’ employability. While the latter 
concerns the matching between higher education outputs and labour market needs, the former 
is a very close determinant of income per capita, a widely used indicator of economic well 
being. Figure 20 clarifies the relationship between efficiency and effectiveness. 



































When testing the relationship between resources used in education and outcomes (labour 
productivity and graduates’ employability), we will take on board the results of the efficiency 
assessment carried out in the preceding section. If efficiency is important and if we were 
successful in measuring it, then it should be the case that what is relevant is not so much the 
amount of resources spent but also if they are used up in an efficient way. It turns out that 
empirical results will uphold this approach.  
 
  553.2 Effectiveness results concerning labour productivity 
 
The relationship between tertiary education spending and labour productivity was assessed 
starting from the following growth equation: 
 
i i i i i u s inv lprod lprod lprod + + + + = 3 2 1 0 98 ) 98 / 05 ( β β β β ,    (10) 
 
where i indexes countries, lprod98 (lprod05) is labour productivity relative to that of the USA 
in 1998 (2005), inv denotes gross fixed capital formation and s is public spending on tertiary 
education. Both inv and s are defined as a percentage of GDP and averaged over 1998-2005.
24  
 
In estimating our parameter of interest, β3, the equation above controls for the effects of 
capital accumulation and of initial productivity levels, as commonly found in growth 
regressions. The use of the investment ratio as a proxy for capital accumulation (following 
Kneller et al., 1999)  stems from the unavailability of capital stock estimates for almost half 
of the countries in our sample. However, since the change in the capital stock is preferable on 
conceptual grounds, we will include it in an alternative specification (see below). 
 
Variable lprodi is labour productivity (defined as GDP per person employed) in country i 
divided by labour productivity in the USA. National productivities are measured in 
purchasing power parity terms
25, so that lprod can be used on the right-hand side as an 
indicator of initial conditions that takes due account of differences in national price levels. 
The dependent variable, (lprod05/lprod98)i, corresponds to the difference between country i 
and the USA in labour productivity growth from 1998 to 2005.  
  
Equation (10) does not allow for differentiated effects across countries according to their 
different degrees of efficiency. Therefore, we also estimate the following:
26 
 
i i i i i i u s eff inv lprod lprod lprod + + + + = . 98 ) 98 / 05 ( 3 2 1 0 β β β β ,    (11) 
 
                                                 
24 Or over a shorter period, if data availability so imposes. 
25 AMECO variable 1 0 212 0 HVGDE (GDP at current market prices per person employed, 1000 PPS).  
26 Ventelou and Bry (2006) use a similar approach for evaluating the impact of public spending on growth. 
  56where effi  is the average efficiency score of country i. Note that the impact of more spending 
on public tertiary education is equal to β3effi, equivalent to β3 if country i is efficient (effi=1) 
but smaller than β3 if the country is inefficient (effi<1). We estimate equation (11) with the 
three sets of input efficiency scores described in section 2 of this report, i.e., variable eff 
successively equals DEA1, DEA2 and SFA. These scores were averaged across the 1998-




TABLE 16: TERTIARY SPENDING, EFFICIENCY, AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
REGRESSION RESULTS (EU COUNTRIES ONLY) 
Equation (10)  (11), 
DEA1 
(11), 
DEA2  (10)  (11),  
SFA 
coef.  -0.510*** -0.527*** -0.486*** -0.367*** -0.371*** 
std.  dev. (0.080) (0.080) (0.083) (0.119) (0.118)  lprod98 
P-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
coef.  0.819 0.936  1.187* 0.204 0.236 
std.  dev. (0.687) (0.681) (0.683) (0.612) (0.695)  inv 
P-value  0.233 0.169 0.082 0.739 0.734 
coef.  3.538 4.138  7.053** 1.561 2.719 
std.  dev. (2.829) (2.533) (3.321) (2.450) (5.552)  s or eff.s 
P-value  0.211 0.102 0.034 0.524 0.624 
Obs  26 26 23 17 17 
R
2  0.735 0.741 0.710 0.583 0.584 
 
The source for variables lprod98, lprod05 and inv is the AMECO database, Spring 2008 release. Asterisks *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
consistent (Eicker-White). R
2 is computed as the squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values. 
 
In Table 16 we report regression results for equations (10) and (11). Variables lprod98 and 
inv present the expected signs, though the latter often fails to reach statistical significance. 
The coefficient of public spending on tertiary education is always positive, but imprecisely 
estimated, and hence not statistically different from zero, in equation (10).
28 The same holds 
when adjusting spending for SFA scores (final column of Table 16). However, if one uses 
DEA scores instead, tertiary spending reaches borderline significance (10,2%) in the case of 
DEA1, and becomes highly significant (3,4%) in the case of DEA2. 
 
                                                 
27 Input coefficients were preferred to output coefficients as they are used to correct spending. Results using an 
alternative SFA model efficiency scores are given in Appendix F. 
28 This equation was estimated twice, with samples matching those for which DEA or SFA efficiency scores 
were available. 
  57The USA and Japan were excluded from the regressions in Table 16. In Appendix F we report 
results including those two countries (Table F2), where the improved significance of DEA-
corrected spending can no longer be detected. Though this is a reminder that the results in 
Table 16 should be regarded with prudence, the exclusion of the two non-European countries 
can actually be justified on grounds of their much smaller public share in total tertiary 
education spending (recall section 1). In other words, for the USA and Japan variables s and 
eff.s are a rather poor proxy for the amount and efficiency of total resources devoted to 
tertiary education, and it is total resources (public or private) and the ensuing outputs that 
should ultimately matter for outcomes such as productivity.  
 
In a simple growth accounting framework, labour productivity growth can be decomposed 
into the contributions of capital deepening and of total factor productivity (TFP). To bring our 
modelling approach closer to that framework we proceed in two steps. First, we replace in the 
previous equations the investment ratio by a more accurate indicator of capital deepening. 
Second, we study whether public spending on tertiary education – corrected or not by 
efficiency scores – exerts any beneficial impact on TFP. 
 
We measure capital deepening on the basis of variable kli, defined as the net capital stock per 
person employed in country i
29 divided by the corresponding capital/labour ratio in the USA. 
As before, the suffix 98 (05) denotes values for 1998 (2005). Hence (kl05/kl98)i gives the 
difference between country i and the USA in capital deepening (i.e., in the growth of capital 
per worker) from 1998 to 2005
30. With this variable, equations (10) and (11) become, 
respectively: 
 
i i i i i u s kl kl lprod lprod lprod + + + + = 3 2 1 0 ) 98 / 05 ( 98 ) 98 / 05 ( β β β β    (12) 
 
i i i i i i u s eff kl kl lprod lprod lprod + + + + = . ) 98 / 05 ( 98 ) 98 / 05 ( 3 2 1 0 β β β β    (13) 
 
Table 17 presents the econometric results for equations (12) and (13). Capital deepening 
strongly contributes to labour productivity growth, whereas initial productivity levels 
                                                 
29 To derive national capital/labour  ratios we divide variable OKND by variable NETD (both from AMECO). 
30 Capital deepening is defined relative to the USA for consistency with labour productivity.  Notice, however, 
that if one used capital deepening in each country “by itself” (i.e., no longer relative to the USA) all results 
would be unchanged, except for parameter  β2. 
  58completely lose their explanatory power. As for spending on tertiary education, results 
confirm and even reinforce those of Table 16: expenditure by itself is not statistically 
significant, but becomes so when corrected for efficiency, regardless of the method used to 
measure the latter (DEA1, DEA2 or SFA). Nonetheless, one should not lose sight of the fact 
that we are working with a rather small sample: only 14 EU members (those prior to the 2004 
enlargement bar Luxemburg), for which the AMECO database contains figures for capital 
stocks. Unlike in the case of Table 16, adding the USA and Japan to the sample does not 
cause efficiency-corrected spending to lose explanatory power (see Appendix F). 
 
TABLE 17: TERTIARY SPENDING, EFFICIENCY, CAPITAL DEEPENING AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
REGRESSION RESULTS (EU COUNTRIES ONLY) 






coef.  0.052 0.016 0.033 0.038 
std.  dev. (0.137) (0.130) (0.130) (0.136)  lprod98 
P-value  0.705 0.903 0.801 0.782 
coef.  1.170*** 1.165*** 1.267*** 1.255*** 
std.  dev. (0.367) (0.347) (0.348) (0.353)  kl05/kl98 
P-value  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
coef.  4.456 3.998*  5.417*** 7.747* 
std.  dev. (2.977) (2.088) (2.102) (4.000)  s or eff.s 
P-value  0.134 0.055 0.010 0.053 
Obs  14 14 14 14 
R
2  0.508 0.526 0.560 0.524 
 
The source for variables lprod98, lprod05 and kl05/kl98 is the AMECO database, Spring 2008 release. Asterisks 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity-consistent (Eicker-White). R
2 is computed as the squared correlation coefficient of actual and 
fitted values. 
 
We now turn to the possible impact of tertiary education public spending and its efficiency on 
total factor productivity. In equations (14) and (15), tfp05 (tfp98) is total factor productivity in 
year 2005 (1998). The remaining variables were already introduced in previous specifications, 
1 β  being our parameter of interest in both equations.  
 
01 (0 5 /9 8 ) ii tfp tfp s ui ββ =+ +        (14) 
 
 
01 (0 5 /9 8 ) . ii tfp tfp eff s u i i ββ =+ +            (15) 
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Table 18 summarizes results from the econometric estimation of equations (14) and (15). 
Again, we are dealing with a small sample of 14 EU countries and some prudence applies. 
The tertiary education public spending coefficient is positive and it becomes statistically 




TABLE  18: TERTIARY SPENDING, EFFICIENCY AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
REGRESSION RESULTS (EU COUNTRIES ONLY) 






coef.  4.589 4.508** 5.610**  7.069 
std. 
dev. 
2.877 2.210 2.313 4.466 
s or eff.s 
P-value  0.111 0.041 0.015 0.113 
Obs  14 14 14 14 
R
2  0.146 0.213 0.251 0.150 
 
The source for variable tfp05/tfp98 is the AMECO database, Spring 2008 release. Asterisks *, **, and *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent 
(Eicker-White). R
2 is computed as the squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values. 
 
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that efficiency matters for effectiveness, results 
being fairly robust to different methods for efficiency assessment. When weighed by 
efficiency scores, public spending on tertiary education has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on labour productivity and on TFP. In a growth accounting framework, the 
latter can be regarded as one of the contributors to the former.  
 
3.3 Effectiveness results concerning employability 
 
We also investigate whether the efficiency of public tertiary education spending influences 
the employability of graduates. Taking unemployment rates as the dependent variable, the 
following equation is estimated: 
 
i i i i i u eff U gradshare U ter U + + + + = − 3 2 1 0 2564 ) sec 2564 2564 ( β β β β ,       (16) 
                                                 
31 Adding the USA and Japan to the sample does not cause efficiency-corrected spending to lose explanatory 
power (see Appendix F). 
  60 
where i indexes countries and gradshare is the dimension of the adult (25-64) population 
having attained tertiary education (ISCED 5-6) relative to (i.e., divided by) adults with 
secondary education attainment (ISCED 3-4). The unemployment rates U2564, U2564ter and 
U2564sec refer respectively to the total population aged 25-64 and to those in this age range 
having attained tertiary or secondary education. As in the case of labour productivity, variable 
eff successively equals DEA1, DEA2 and SFA. 
 
In equation (16) our parameter of interest is β3, which should take a negative value if it is the 
case that more efficient spending reduces graduates’ unemployment risk relative to those with 
secondary education only. Variable gradshare controls for the relative abundance of 
graduates (a supply-side effect in the labour market), and U2564 for other structural 
characteristics of the labour market. All variables except eff are ten-year averages
32 (1998-
2007), so as to minimize cyclical effects. 
 
TABLE 19: EFFICIENCY IN TERTIARY SPENDING AND UNEMPLOYMENT RISK OF ADULTS 
REGRESSION RESULTS (EU COUNTRIES ONLY) 
 
      DEA1  DEA2  SFA 
coef.  0.023*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 
std.  dev.  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
gradshare 
P-value  0.002 0.001 0.001 
coef.  -0.633*** -0.718*** -0.660*** 
std.  dev.  (0.075) (0.065) (0.097) 
U2564 
P-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 
coef. 0.003  -0.016*  -0.043** 
std.  dev.  (0.011) (0.009) (0.021) 
eff 
P-value  0.811 0.068 0.047 
Obs  26 23 17 
R
2  0.810 0.812 0.759 
 
The source for variables U2564, U2564ter, U2564sec and gradshare is Eurostat. In the case of Malta, we have 
constructed the dependent variable using Eurostat data on employment rates and activity rates in the 25-64 age 
interval for the respective levels of educational attainment: as is well known, unemployment (u), employment (e) 
and activity (a) rates can be related by u = 100*(1-e/a). Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent (Eicker-White). R
2 is computed as 
the squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values. 
 
                                                 
32 Due to missing values, averaging sometimes takes place over a shorter period. 
  61Results in Table 19 show a highly significant effect of variable gradshare, with the expected 
sign: a higher relative supply of graduates increases their relative unemployment rate. The 
overall unemployment rate (U2564) seems to exert the opposite effect, increasing the 
“employability premium” of tertiary attainment. Finally, in two out of three specifications, 
more efficient spending is found to minimize the relative unemployment risk of graduates: 
namely, this is the case for efficiency scores DEA2 and SFA. We have checked that this effect 
stems from the efficiency of spending, rather than from the financial outlays themselves: 
public spending on tertiary education – either by itself (variable s) or adjusted for efficiency 
with any of the three sets of scores (variable eff.s) – fails to exert any statistically significant 
influence on the dependent variable. 
 
The samples considered in Table 19 only comprise European countries. As in the analysis of 
labour productivity, we find that including the USA and Japan causes efficiency scores to lose 
their statistical significance (full results are reported in Appendix F). 
 
Since our efficiency scores refer to the recent past, one would expect that they have an impact 
not only on the employability of graduates in general, but also – and perhaps especially – on 
the employability of young graduates. To check whether such an effect exists, we estimate a 
modified version of equation (16) where the dependent variable is restricted to the 25-29 age 
range:  
 
i i i i i u eff U gradshare U ter U + + + + = − 3 2 1 0 2564 ) sec 2529 2529 ( β β β β .   (17) 
 
  62TABLE 20: EFFICIENCY IN TERTIARY SPENDING AND UNEMPLOYMENT RISK OF YOUNG WORKERS 
REGRESSION RESULTS (EU COUNTRIES ONLY) 
      DEA1  DEA2  SFA 
coef.  0.015 0.025 0.032 
std.  dev.  (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) 
gradshare 
P-value  0.487 0.197 0.108 
coef.  -0.733*** -0.838*** -0.955*** 
std.  dev.  (0.190) (0.140) (0.169) 
U2564 
P-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 
coef.  -0.023 -0.077*** -0.240*** 
std.  dev.  (0.031) (0.023) (0.048) 
eff 
P-value  0.450 0.001 0.000 
Obs  26 23 17 
R
2  0.328 0.402 0.466 
 
We have constructed the dependent variable using Eurostat data on employment rates and activity rates in the 
25-29 age interval for the respective levels of educational attainment: as is well known, unemployment (u), 
employment (e) and activity (a) rates can be related by u = 100*(1-e/a). Asterisks *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent (Eicker-
White). R
2 is computed as the squared correlation coefficient of actual and fitted values. 
 
The coefficients of variables gradshare and U2564 in Table 20 are broadly similar to their 
counterparts in Table 19, though the former variable loses statistical significance. More 
importantly, the impact of efficiency (measured by scores DEA2 or SFA) is substantially 
reinforced, both numerically and statistically.
33 Therefore, a better efficiency performance of 
higher education institutions in the 1998-2005 period (used to estimate DEA and SFA scores) 
seems to benefit particularly those who were studying at that time, or shortly before. 
 
3.4 A summary of effectiveness results 
 
The main message conveyed by the previous analysis is that efficiency matters for 
effectiveness. Public spending on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP only becomes 
significantly associated to higher labour productivity growth, or to faster TFP growth, when 
adjusted for efficiency. As for the other outcome considered – the employability of graduates, 
proxied by their relative unemployment risk – the empirical support for the importance of 
efficiency is even stronger, especially in the case of young workers, i.e., those studying 
roughly in the same period used for the computation of efficiency scores. It is also 
                                                 
33 No results are presented for a sample including the USA and Japan as we could not find data for U2529ter and 
U2529sec for these two countries. 
  63encouraging that, with only a few exceptions, the significance of efficiency is robust to the 
different estimation methodologies discussed in Section 2 (DEA1, DEA2, SFA). 
 
Conclusions in the previous paragraph, however, do not go without some qualifications. First, 
the time span considered is rather short (for data availability reasons), preventing us from 
explicitly taking account of lagged and dynamic effects through panel data modelling. One 
should note, however, that our analysis of the employability of young graduates goes some 
way to alleviate this problem, by better aligning the sample years with the likely generation of 
labour market effects. Second, the cross-section dimension of the sample becomes quite small 
in some specifications, and results are sometimes sensitive to whether the USA and Japan are 
included or not (though their exclusion can be plausibly justified on grounds of their much 
smaller public share in total tertiary education spending). Finally, and as regards the failure to 
find significant impacts of public spending by itself, one should note that our specification for 
employability does not easily lend itself to the detection of such an impact: for instance, 
higher spending probably implies more abundant graduates, and therefore a supply-side 
increase in their unemployment risk.  Therefore, though efficiency matters, it would be rash to 
conclude that only efficiency matters, dismissing the amount of spending as irrelevant. 
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By estimating efficiency of tertiary public education provision across countries, with proper 
assessment of variables that explain inefficiency, and also by studying the effectiveness of 
public spending on higher education, a number of conclusions are warranted. These are: 
 
Inefficiency in spending is an important issue when it comes to public tertiary education. In 
both our approaches, semi-parametric and stochastic frontier analysis, we could estimate a 
production possibility or cost frontier, and infer that an important group of countries was 
found to be operating under inefficiency conditions irrespective of the methods used. These 
were not only South and Eastern European countries, but also some of the more populous EU 
member states (France, Germany, and Italy). Also the US public tertiary education sector was 
found to be very far from efficiency.  
 
Tertiary education systems in a core group of countries in Europe are clearly more efficient. If 
it is a fact that inefficiency is pervasive across Europe, it is also true that some European 
countries differ from the rest, in so far as they present clearly better results (outputs) from the 
consumed resources (inputs). The UK and to a lesser extent the Netherlands appear at the top 
of the efficiency ranking irrespective of method or models used.
34 On the other hand, some 
countries tend to be consistently placed at the bottom league (the Czech Republic, Greece, 
Portugal, and Slovakia). 
 
Tertiary education efficiency is related to institutional factors and also to the quality of 
secondary education. The quality of secondary education, as measured by results attained by 
students at PISA internationally comparable tests, is one of the factors that is consistently 
correlated to country efficiency scores. Other factors pertain to higher education institutional 
features. These are:
35 
-  The funding rules followed in each country. When funding to institutions depends more 
on outputs (e.g., graduations and publications) and less on historical attributions or 
inputs, efficiency tends to increase.  
                                                 
34 This group broadly coincides with those countries mentioned as having a better performance in a recently 
published Bruegel report (see Aghion et al., 2008).  
35 Again, we note a broad correspondence to the factors identified by Aghion et al. (2008). 
  65-  Evaluation systems. Efficiency tends to be higher in countries where institutions are 
publicly evaluated by stakeholders and/or independent agencies. 
-  Staff policy. Institutions’ autonomy to hire and dismiss academic staff and to set their 
wages is correlated with higher efficiency.  
 
Efficient spending matters for labour and total factor productivity. Our analysis of 
effectiveness showed that there is a positive correlation between tertiary education spending 
corrected by efficiency scores and labour and total factor productivity. This suggests that the 
link between resources used in tertiary education and broader outcomes like productivity goes 
through efficiency. This is evidence in favour of the greater importance of efficiency in higher 
education spending, as it is not only a matter of public finance but also a way of promoting 
innovation and growth. 
 
Efficient spending matters for employability. We found that the employability of graduates 
increases where tertiary education is more efficient. The difference in unemployment rates 
among graduates and among those with secondary education depends positively on country 
efficiency scores. This evidence is stronger when young graduates are considered.  
 
Some countries specialise in teaching and others in research. Efficiency analysis showed that 
some countries seem to specialise more in research than in the teaching part of tertiary 
education.  This is the case of the Nordic countries, of Austria, of Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Others are more efficient in teaching (Ireland, France, the East European 
countries). The United Kingdom was found to be efficient on both accounts.  
 
These conclusions lead us to put forward the following broad policy implications.  
 
Spending increases, if they occur, have to be carefully managed and should go hand in hand 
with institutional reforms. From our analysis it becomes clear that better performing countries 
are not necessarily those where more resources are spent on higher education. It is efficient 
spending that matters. It follows that increased spending will be much more successful in 
output terms if it is efficiency enhancing.  
 
Institutional reform of tertiary educational systems should focus on the following points: 
  66-  promoting accountability of tertiary education institutions, with careful and fair 
evaluation ensured by independent bodies; 
-  increasing competition, by rising the institutions’ autonomy in what concerns staff 
policy, namely in its ability to hire and dismiss and to set wages; 
-  designing financial schemes that relate funding to the institutions’ performance in output 
terms, rather than relying in inputs used or in historical trends. 
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Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands are one of the top performers in the EU higher education system. The 
performance in teaching is average in numerical terms, but it is the research dimension that 
achieves excellence (see Figure 18). Quality in both dimensions is extremely high. Dutch 
performance compares to that of the Nordic countries, namely Denmark, Finland, and 
Sweden, but good value for money is one of the main characteristics of the entire Dutch 
higher education system. 
 
In what follows, we briefly characterize the Dutch higher education system with the purpose 
of identifying best practices. 
 
Brief characterization of the Tertiary education system in the Netherlands 
 
Analysis of the data 
 
The input figures for tertiary education reveal relatively modest scores. The number of 
academic staff per 1000 inhabitants was 2.18 in 2005, slightly above average, whereas 
countries like Sweden (3.66) and Finland (3.42) have higher numbers. The number of students 
per member of 1000 inhabitants was 34.6 in 2005, again close to the average value of 35.7. 
Total annual investment in education is just below EU average, even though public 
expenditure on PGD institutions is quite high (333.7 against an average of 242.1 real Euros 
PPS per capita). 
 
Regarding outputs, by reviewing an indicator of the ‘graduation ratio’ (the relationship 
between the number of graduates and the number of students) the Netherlands are an average 
performer, since in 2005 about 20% of the students graduate, whereas in the UK the score is 
27.7% and in Japan, the incontestable leader, the score is 53.4%. Quality indicators, however, 
show that the Dutch students are perceived to be among the best. In fact, the Netherlands are 
placed third in the recruiter review country indicator, just below Ireland and the UK, and 
fourth in the peer review country indicator, below the Nordic countries. 
 
  68In research, the score of the Netherlands is excellent. The number of scientific publications 
per 1000 inhabitants was 0.96 in 2005, quite above the average score of 0.54 for the sample 
total and only surpassed by the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, and Denmark). This fact 
reveals that the Dutch academic staff is more productive than the average in terms of the 
number of publications. When one considers the impact of scientific productions, the 
Netherlands is among the world top. In fact, it attains the maximum value for the average of 
ISI citation index in the period 1998-2005. 
 
The more general picture is that, in comparison to the other countries under analysis, 
investment is relatively modest but the output is good and in some cases excellent. The 
Netherlands thus have an elaborated and well balanced system of institutions that perform 
well under the given circumstances. 
 
As for the factors that may explain such performance, the Netherlands obtain the highest 
score for the Staff Policy Indicator and is ranked third in terms of the Evaluation Indicator. 
The Funding Rules Indicator is slightly above the average value of 5, whereas the Output 
Flexibility Indicator, which appears to be negatively related to efficiency, is 5.9, well below 
the average of 6.7. 
 
Structure of institutions and funding arrangements 
 
The higher education system in the Netherlands is nowadays based on a three-cycle degree 
system, consisting of a bachelor, master, and PhD. Until 2002, the first two cycles at research 
universities were combined in a single integrated cycle. 
 
There are two types of programmes: research oriented education, traditionally offered by 
research universities, and professional higher education, traditionally offered by hogescholen, 
or universities of professional education. These programmes differ not only in focus, but also 
in access requirements, length, and degree nomenclature. Research activities are not 
traditionally the task of hogescholen, but of universities, academic medical centres, and 
research institutes. 
 
There are thus four categories of publicly funded  institutions of tertiary education and 
research: 
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-  Hogescholen: 44 government-funded hogescholen in total; 
-  Universities: 14 universities including the Open University, having a task in 
education but also in research; 
-  Academic medical centres: 8 in total, with a triple task: education (bachelor, 
master, medical specialists, and PhD), research, and patient care; and 
-  Research institutes: funding organisations for university research, as well as 
highly specialised top quality research organisations themselves. 
 
As for research, the Dutch research system consists of universities, non-university research 
institutes, and other research centres (technological institutes). Its heart lies in the universities 
and academic medical centres. 
  
Institutions of tertiary education in the Netherlands obtain funds from both public and private 
sources. Many publicly funded institutes also undertake commercial activities and receive 
tuition fees. The universities speak of three budget streams, two public and one private: 
 
• public formula funding goes directly to institutes of higher education for all their tasks (first 
stream); 
• another stream of public funding goes via the research council to research proposals in 
competition (second stream); 
• private income for commissioned research or other tasks (third stream), business. 
 
Thus, investments in research activities consist of public funds and private funds. The public 
expenditure for research activities at universities and research institutions amounted to € 
3.569 billion in 2003, 0.75% of the GDP but decreasing. This figure is above the average EU-
25 figure of 0.64%.
36 Private expenditure on research is more modest. Funding the tertiary 
system is primarily a governmental task. 
 
                                                 
36 Data taken from the OECD Thematic Review of Tertiary Education – The Netherlands (2006). 
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Four explanatory variables have proved to be relevant in explaining efficiency, namely, staff 
policy, output flexibility, evaluation, and funding rules. In what follows, we characterize the 
Dutch higher education system along each of these dimensions. 
  
1.  Staff Policy 
1.1. Hiring/Firing 
1.1.1.  Autonomy to hire and dismiss academic staff  
 
The Dutch institutions are the decision makers in the field of staff recruitment. 
 
1.2. Wages 
1.2.1.  Autonomy to set wages 
 
Negotiating terms of employment are delegated to the institutions’ branch organisations (the 
association of universities and the association of hogescholen). It is thus an internal affair. 
Furthermore, the institutions of tertiary education and research are autonomous for spending 
their formula funding received from the government for recruitment of personnel and working 
conditions. 
 
2.  Output Flexibility 
2.1. Course content and exams 
2.1.1.  Autonomy to set course content 
 
The actual content of curricula and research programmes is up to the institutions themselves, 
with the remark that the NVAO (the Accreditation Organisation of The Netherlands and 
Flanders) checks if the profile of a programme is geared to the labour market versus more 
academically oriented. Furthermore, certain requirements (e.g., those of the accreditation) 
have to be met in order to receive public funding. And steering at a central level is 
accomplished by means of financial incentives (as described below in the section on public 
funding). 
 
  712.1.2.  Are there academic fields for which the final exam and/or the study 
programme are the same in all tertiary education institutions throughout the 
country/jurisdiction?  
 
The law regulates several aspects of the institutions of tertiary education and research. 
Namely, each programme is obliged to have a specific ‘education and exam regulation,’ 
which governs the content of the curriculum and the procedures concerning exams. Still, 
defining study programmes and exams are set by the institutions themselves. 
 
2.2. Offer of short studies 
2.2.1.  Do tertiary education institutions offer short study programmes (max. duration 
below 3 years)?  
 
In the period of time under analysis in this report there were no short study programmes 
offered. Still, short courses with a duration of 2 years, complying with the level descriptor for 
short higher education in the Bologna framework, became available in hogescholen from 
September 2006 onwards. This change was due to labour market demand and to the fact that 
the Netherlands seemed to have a lack of diversity within qualifications - with only bachelor, 
master degrees, and PhD - when compared to other European countries. 
 
2.3. Student Choice 
2.3.1.  Do tertiary education institutions admit part-time learners, distance-learners, 
and learners with professional experience (outside the usual enrolment 
requirements)? 
 
Part-time education is offered, namely at  hogescholen, as well as dual education, which 
combines study and work in the same area. Moreover, the Open University, a public funded 
university, has been providing distance-learning courses in higher education since 1984. The 
Open University offers full degree courses, but students can also take part of a course or a few 
subjects only. 
 
Not only secondary education provides a basis for tertiary education. Some learners that have 
had ‘less’ formal education, but acquired enough skills and knowledge to enter higher 
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Open University even offers some courses, which have no entrance requirements. 
 
2.4. Regional Mobility 
2.4.1.  What is the percentage of students enrolled into tertiary education institutions 
outside their region of high-school graduation?  
 
In what international mobility is concerned, the numbers of foreign students in the 
Netherlands is well below OECD level and is a fraction of the figures shown by countries 
such the UK, Belgium, and Germany. The average percentage of foreigners has grown from 
2.98% in 1999 to 4.04% in 2003. The number of foreign students in universities is higher 
(5.6%) than in hogescholen (3.17%). Both figures have grown steadily over the reported 
years. 
 
2.5. Existence of numerus clausus 
2.5.1.  Are there academic fields into which entry is restricted or rationed by 
national/regional regulations? 
 
A numerus clausus set by the government (ministers of Education and Health jointly) exists 
only for students in medicine, dentistry, and some paramedical programmes. However, 
legislation allows central government to set a maximum enrolment number for certain courses 
based on labour market considerations. This is the case of the programmes in the arts (music, 
fine arts). Otherwise, higher education institutions are obliged by law to admit any student 
with the required secondary school certificate. 
 
3.  Evaluation 
 
The aim of the Dutch higher education institutions is laid down by law: universities have aims 
in terms of research and education, hogescholen primarily in education. How they do this is 
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There are a number of actors involved with surveillance and control, namely, NVAO (the 
Accreditation Organisation of The Netherlands and Flanders), the inspectorate of higher 
education, and the accountancy division of the ministry. 
 
3.1.1.  Ministerial oversight 
 
The inspectorate of higher education is an independent part of the ministry. Its task is to check 
if institutes abide with rules and regulations, and to oversee the functioning of the system. 
 
The accountancy division of the ministry checks whether the expenditure of both ministry and 
institutions complies with the financial regulations. 
 
3.1.2.  Evaluation by an independent agency  
3.1.2.1.Teaching 
 
Until 2002, the institutions of tertiary education and research themselves (through their 
respective branch organisations, the association of universities and the association of 
hogescholen) organised the quality assurance. They had developed a system (originating 
around 1990) in which self-evaluation was complemented by ‘peer review.’ Results had to be 
made public by law. The Minister of Education was still responsible for the quality of (higher) 
education, and had the right to intervene in the case of serious concern about the quality of a 
programme or the quality assurance system. But on the whole the institutes themselves were 
responsible for quality assurance. 
 
In 2002 there was an important change in the quality assurance system for higher education 
(at both hogescholen and universities). The way quality assurance was organised changed into 
a system of accreditation of programmes, in order to be more internationally comparable.  
 
In this new system, NVAO (the Accreditation Organisation of The Netherlands and Flanders) 
awards accreditations to programmes, based on a report produced by an independent 
assessment organisation. Existing programmes have to be accredited every 6 years. New 
programmes have to be accredited before students can be registered. If a programme is not 
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Accreditation organisations evaluate six main areas: goals, programme (must have 
relationship with research in the case of universities, or with professional field in the case of 
hogescholen, must be coherent), staff (must be of sufficient quantity and quality), facilities 
(sufficient material facilities and tutoring), internal quality assurance (systematic evaluation 
of the programme, in which judgments of staff, students, alumni, and professional field must 
be incorporated), and results (quality of graduates must meet minimum standards, and output 




Quality assurance of research is organised through the ‘Standard Evaluation Protocol for 
public research organisations’ and handled by the universities in interaction with the KNAW 
(Royal Academy of Science) and NWO (Research Council). 
  
This protocol provides both the procedures for assessing the quality of research and the 
criteria that are used. The main criteria are quality (international recognition and innovative 
potential), productivity (scientific output), relevance (scientific and socio-economic impact), 
and vitality/feasibility (flexibility, management, and leadership). 
 
All universities are obliged to evaluate their research activities every three years. 
Additionally, every six years an external committee – completely independent of the research 
institutes involved – assesses these research activities. The external assessment covers both 
the content of the research programme and the management, strategy and mission of the 
research centre where it is carried out. The results are made public, serving the accountability, 
and they are also used as a management tool by institutes.  
 
In conclusion, assessment of research quality is still very much performed by the sector itself. 
Together with the competitive allocation of research council funds, described in section 4.1 
below, there is adequate steering on quality of research. 
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3.2. Stakeholder evaluation  
3.2.1.  Students’ evaluation 
 
On a yearly basis, a large survey among students in tertiary education programmes is 
conducted in both hogescholen and universities. Students assess the quality of their 
programme on a standardised number of topics. An overview of the results aimed at future 
students is then compiled giving information on the quality of programmes, which also serves 
as a benchmark instrument for the institutes themselves. 
 
3.3. Labour market 
 
Even though a number of measures aim at reconciling the number of students in different 
disciplines supplied by the higher education sector and labour market demand, no formal 
quality assessment exercise is made by employers. In fact, systematic evaluations for the 
entire spectrum of courses in tertiary education do not exist in the Dutch system. 
 
3.4. Public Information 
3.4.1.  Outside observers (e.g., rankings in news magazines, international 
organisations) 
 
Evidence of the quality of Dutch tertiary education is found in several international university 
rankings. In rankings such as the Academic Ranking of World Universities 2005 or the Times 
Higher Education Supplement (2004) the position of Dutch institutions is good. In some 
areas, they do perform in the first rank in a European context (10 of 13 universities in the 
European top 100, 12 of 13 appear in World top 500). 
 
3.5. Are the results of the quality assessments to be made publicly available? 
 
Before 2002, peer review results were made public by law. After this date, quality assurance 
results obtained though institutional evaluation have been used to fill a database providing 
information on study programmes. Also, the results of the students’ assessment are publicly 
available. 
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4.   Funding rules 
 
As mentioned above, there is a system of three streams of money. The first stream is the 
stream directly financed by the Minister of Education, Science, and Culture. The second 
stream is the NWO (the Dutch organisation for Scientific Research) and KNAW funding. The 
first stream is about twice the size of the second stream. The third stream consists of direct 
commissions for research and education from private companies, central government, the EU, 
and NGOs. 
 
4.1. Public funding 
 
 The first stream of money crucially depends on the registered number of students and number 
of diplomas (successful completions), the latter having the biggest weight in the funding 
formula. It is thus mainly output oriented. The formula funding also envisages maintenance of 
buildings and includes a budget for (fundamental) research that is based on history. 
 
Unlike the funding mechanisms of education, which are largely based on output, the 
distinctive feature of the second stream of money to finance research is competition on the 
basis of scientific quality (peer reviews). The amount a university acquires in the second 
stream depends on the quality of the research proposals. Through the second stream central 
government is thus able to influence competition and quality aspects of research. 
 
NWO (the abbreviation for the Dutch organisation for Scientific Research) is the organisation 
that, besides governing several research institutes, allocates research funds to universities. 
Three allocation procedures are used by NWO: 
-  Fixed budgets for scientific priorities: NWO identifies promising scientific 
fields, describing the kind of research to be performed; 
-  Specific programmes: to stimulate talented young scientists or specific target 
groups (ethnic minorities, women); 
-  The ‘open competition:’ for which scientists in all fields can submit research 
proposals that are evaluated by experts and awarded grants when among the 
most promising. 
 
  774.2. Do the results of quality assessments have an effect on funding decisions? 
 
NVAO (the Accreditation Organisation of The Netherlands and Flanders) determines whether 
a programme meets the requirements for government funding. All Bachelor and Master 
Programs at Dutch universities and hogescholen need to be accredited in order to (continue 
to) receive part of the government budget. 
 
4.3. Private funding 
4.3.1.  Tuition fees and/or households  
 
Funding by students consists primarily of tuition fees. With some exceptions the tuition fee 
set by the government was € 1496 in the academic year 2005-06. 
 
4.3.2.  Business, abroad, other 
 
Contributions by companies are primarily made in terms of research assignments. Like all 
other continental European countries, the Netherlands does not have a history of companies 
contributing directly to the higher education institutions by making donations. Through 
participation in dual courses, giving access to research facilities, commissioning research and 
other contacts, companies do, however, play a vital role in the system. Still, the contribution 
made by private businesses to research activities is far below average compared to other 
OECD countries 
 
5.  PISA 
 
The Dutch secondary system is performing among the best measured by the international 
PISA benchmark. Practically all graduates from secondary education progress into further 
education, mostly into hogeschool or university. Access is irrespective of gender or socio-
economic background. 
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The United Kingdom appears in our analysis as top performer, both when we consider only 
research outputs and only teaching outputs, as can observed in Figure 18. It is hence 
important to analyze closely the British tertiary education system to identify the conditions 
that contribute to this success.  
 
Brief characterization of the Tertiary education system in UK 
 
Analysis of the data 
 
Some analysis of the data may provide insights on why the UK achieves such high levels of 
efficiency. In what concerns inputs we observed that Academic staff per 1000 inhabitants is 
low compared to the average of the countries considered in the study (1.55/1.97). On the 
contrary the number of students per 1000 inhabitants is higher than average, which implies 
that there is a high ratio of Students per Academic Staff. Although this could be considered as 
a negative feature for producing graduates, observing the outputs we have precisely the 
opposite: in the indicator of Graduates per 1000 Inhabitants, UK is placed third and it presents 
the highest level of Graduates per Academic Staff. So, we have that few academics per 
student are able to produce a high number of graduates. Moreover, quality indicators also 
show that graduates of UK institutions are perceived as the second best by recruiters whe 
compared to the other countries’ graduates. This can be explained both through the efficiency 
of academic staff and by the a priori quality of students as indicated by PISA scores, where 
the UK are placed second after Japan.    
 
Considering the second output of Tertiary Institutions, research, UK has the sixth highest 
number of publications per 1000 Inhabitants. Also these publications have a high quality 
measured by the average number of citations (ISI citation index of 5 on an average of 3.55). 
Regarding the explanatory factors found relevant for efficiency, we find that the UK has the 
highest scores for the Staff Policy Indicator and the Evaluation Indicator. As for funding 
rules, the score is not as high, with UK in the 7
th position with a score of 5.5 (the average is 
5.0).  
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In UK, higher education is provided mainly in universities and higher education colleges. All 
these institutions receive public funds but are independent and self-governing.
37 The 
expenditure on PGD in the UK as a percentage of GDP is one of the highest among the 
European countries. In 2005, UK was fourth in this indicator, after Finland, Denmark, and 
Sweden. However UK universities are not exclusively public funded. The funding is also 
complemented by non-government funding, which represents around 40% of total funding as 
can be observed in Figure 21.  Part of the non-government funding comes from private tuition 
fees.  
 
FIGURE 21:  SOURCES OF INCOME OF UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES IN THE UK (2005) 
 
Source: Higher Education Funding Council for England publication 2005/10. 
 
Also from Figure 21 we observe that around 40% of the total higher education institutions’ 
funding is of the responsibility of higher education Funding Bodies, independent from the 
government. This has been a tradition of the British system since 1970, and it prevents 
political influences on the funding of individual universities.  
 
 
Governance and regulatory framework 
 
Since 1991, the UK has abolished the difference between Polytechnic Institutions and 
Universities, creating a single sector of teaching and research institutions. The objective was 
to foster competition between a wider range of institutions such that it would lead to increased 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
                                                 
37 There is a very small group of private colleges, government independent, which provide academic 
programmes for about 0.3-0.5% of all higher education students, mainly in medical-related, business, or 
theological subjects.  
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colleges to gain their own powers for awarding degrees and for gaining university status. 
 
The specific roles of the Government, Funding Councils, and individual institutions are 
specified by law.  
1)  The Government sets the total funding for universities and has the power to set 
conditions to the Funding Councils covering national developments that it wishes to 
promote. The Government is not however able to determine the general (or block) 
grants to individual universities or to intervene in such areas as the content of 
academic programs, the appointment of staff (including Vice-Chancellors), or the 
admission of students.   
2)  The Funding Bodies advise the Government on the needs of higher education and 
allocate available funds for teaching and research. They also have responsibility for 
promoting high quality teaching and research, encourage interactions with business 
and the community, promote widening access and increasing participation, inform 
students about the quality of higher education available, and ensure the proper use of 
public funds.  
3)  Each institution has a governing body who sets the mission and strategic plans and 
also monitors, supports (and, if necessary, challenge) the performance both of the 
institution, and of the Vice-Chancellor and senior colleagues. The governing bodies 
provide the first line of accountability in terms of ensuring that institutions meet the 
needs of students, local communities, and society (including employers) at large.  
4)  The National Audit Office (NAO) audits the expenditure of higher education 
institutions. 
5)  The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) ensures the external 
quality of higher education. It is independent of UK governments and is owned by the 
organisations that represent the heads of UK universities and colleges. The QAA’s 
role is to judge how well institutions fulfil their responsibility for managing the 
academic standards and quality of their awards. 
 
As already mentioned, the advantage of the existence of Funding Councils is that decisions 
about funding for individual universities are not subject to political pressures. The main factor 
for allocating funds for teaching is the number of students completing a specified element of 
their program. Funds for research are linked closely with the assessed quality and volume of 
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teaching and research in individual universities. One potential disadvantage of the separate 
Funding Bodies is the excessive bureaucracy.  To limit this effect, the UK Government has an 
active policy toward reducing imposed bureaucracy on public institutions.
38  
 
In addition to the funds from Funding Bodies, institutions may apply for research grants from 
the Research Councils, the European Union and other bodies. They are also encouraged to 
raise their own funds, for example through the recruitment of overseas students, the 
development of short professional courses, the setting up of science parks for external 
companies, the creation of university companies, or donations from alumni.  
 
Explanatory factors for efficiency 
 
1.  Staff policy  
1.1  Hiring/Firing 
1.1.1  Autonomy to hire and dismiss academic staff  
 
Universities and colleges determine the criteria for appointing and promoting staff. These 
depend on the missions of individual universities and colleges. Generally, more emphasis is 
being placed on teaching quality and contributions to business and the community. Whenever 
recruitment problems exist, universities may adopt special measures to recruit staff – such as 
employing staff in employment elsewhere to teach part-time. 
 
1.2  Wages 
1.2.1  Autonomy to set wages 
 
As private sector institutions, the universities and colleges have considerable autonomy in 
what concerns wage definition. They set their own salaries, although the majority chooses to 
work with other institutions to agree common salary scales for all but the senior staff. 
Universities are also allowed to reward excellence in teaching and research, according to their 
own set of rules and objectives.  
                                                 
38 It has been estimated by the Higher Education Funding Council for England that the cost of bureaucracy for 
English universities and colleges has been cut by 25% in the four years to 2004 and there is a similar target for 
the next four years.  
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2.  Output Flexibility 
2.1  Course content and exams  
2.1.1  Autonomy to set course content  
 
Each institution reviews and determines its own set of academic programs and course 
contents in line with the strategy that it has set itself and its assessment of demand from 
students. It also determines its emphasis on pure and applied research, having regard to its 
assessment of the scope for obtaining funds for research. 
 
2.2  Offer of short studies  
2.2.1  Do tertiary education institutions offer short study programmes (max. 
duration below 3 years)?  
 
Typical courses last for three years (if taken full-time) and lead to a Bachelors degree with 
Honours, having a title such as Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science. Also at this level 
there are short courses and professional 'conversion' courses, based largely on undergraduate 
material, and taken usually by those who are already graduates in another discipline, leading 
to Graduate Certificates or Graduate Diplomas.  
 
Foundation degrees are two-year degrees, which aim to give people the intermediate technical 
and professional skills that are in demand from employers, and to provide more flexible and 
accessible ways of studying.  
 
There are also short courses at the Masters level often forming part of Continuing 
Professional Development programmes and leading to Postgraduate Certificates and 
Postgraduate Diplomas. 
 
2.3  Student choice 
2.3.1  Do tertiary education institutions offer a range of courses within each 
study programme among which students can choose?  
 
Yes, higher education institutions offer a range of courses and short courses within each study 
programme. 
  832.3.2  Do tertiary education institutions admit part-time learners, distance-
learners, and learners with professional experience (outside the usual 
enrolment requirements)? 
 
Part-time studying and distance learning is a reality in UK higher education institutions as 
there has always been a substantial number of adult students taking degree qualifications part-
time. In Figure 22 we observe that roughly one fourth of all students are part-timers. The new 
Foundation Degrees may be attractive to more adults studying part-time. Individual 
institutions set their own level of fees for part-time courses. Apart from distance learning, 
competition is more restricted than for full-time courses because most part-time students 
study locally. The fees depend more on what students or their employers are willing to pay. 
Although the numbers of students are close to the numbers of full-time students, the fee 
income is substantially less because part-time fees reflect the part-time teaching and learning 
requirements. Many other universities and colleges provide some courses through distance 
learning, including e-learning.  
 
FIGURE 22: FULL-TIME AND PART-TIME STUDENTS IN UK INSTITUTIONS   
 
 
2.4  Regional mobility 
2.4.1   What is the percentage of students enrolled into tertiary education 
institutions outside their region of high-school graduation? 
 
Groups of universities and colleges are being formed on a regional basis with the aim of 
making a maximum contribution to the local and regional economy. However, certain regions 
are still net importers of students, as for example, Yorkshire, North East, East Midlands, and 
North West.  
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Source: OECD- Thematic Review of Tertiary Education 
 
2.5  Existence of numerus clausus  
2.5.1  Are there academic fields into which entry is restricted or rationed by 
national/regional regulations? 
 
The UK is regarded as having a highly selective system with fixed numbers for every course 
and different levels of additional selection procedures. However, there are also well-
developed alternative routes into higher education, namely through part-time courses. 
 
3.  Funding rules 
3.1  Public funding  
 
There are four stages in calculating the main element of the Higher Education Funding 
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FIGURE 24: STEPS IN THE CALCULATION OF THE FUNDING FOR TEACHING 
 
Source: OECD- Thematic Review of Tertiary Education 
 
Public funding of research in distributed by the Office of Science and Technology to the 
different Research Councils aiming to support specific research and programmes across the 
UK, much of it on the basis of competitive bids from researchers in universities and colleges.  
 
FIGURE 25: SOURCES OF RESEARCH INCOME 
 
Source: Higher Education Funding Council for England Guide 2005/10; figures in £ million 
 
The instrument for the allocation of research funds is the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE). The RAE has two purposes. First, it provides comprehensive information on the 
quality of UK research in every subject area. Secondly, it provides a basis for the allocation of 
funds in line with the government’s policy. The RAE outcome determines the main allocation 
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Funding Councils, although each formula is based on a link between funding and research 
quality. The allocations for research differentiate significantly according to the assessed 
quality of research.
39   
 
3.2  Outcome oriented 
3.2.1  Funding depend on the number of graduates and/or completed PhDs 
 
The main factor for allocating funds is the number of students graduating from specific 
courses. 
3.2.2  Public funding depend on the number of publications 
 
Funds for research depend on the number of publications and quality of these publications. 
 
3.2.3  Public funding depend on other outputs  
 
Funds for research are linked closely with the assessed quality and volume of research. 
 
3.2.4  Funding depend on outcomes (e.g., final marks, results of evaluations 
by external commissions or students; quality-adjusted number of publications).  
 
An incentive is the funding available to reward good teaching alongside the negotiated 
settlements for academic pay. There are initiatives also to raise the status of teaching in higher 
education – the selective National Teacher Fellowships and associated monetary prizes, the 
designation of Centres for Excellence in Teaching and Learning (CETLs), and raising the 
status of the profession of teaching. 
  
3.2.5  Do the results of quality assessments have an effect on funding 
decisions?  
Quality assessments are the main instrument for allocation of funding.  
                                                 
39 In England, nine universities out of over 130 institutions receive about one half of the total funding allocated 
on the basis of research quality. At the other end of the spectrum, many universities receive funding in 
recognition of high quality research in one or two subject areas; and a few may not receive any RAE funding. 
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3.3  Private funding 
3.3.1  Tuition fees and/or households  
3.3.1.1  Funding from tuition fees 
 
Higher education institutions have always charged tuition fees for part-time undergraduate 
students and postgraduate students. There have been tuition fees also for full-time home 
undergraduates for over 50 years. The full-time fees varied between some 10-20% of the 
average costs of tuition and were paid in full for most students as part of the student 
maintenance grant. In 1998, the Government decided to set a tuition fee of £1000 for full-time 
undergraduate students. For the first time, these fees would be paid by students or their 
parents. Institutions charging higher fees than at present are required to use part of the extra 
income to support wider access. Subsidised loans will be available to meet the cost and will 
be repaid after graduation according to a graduate’s income. 
 
4.  Evaluation  
 
The Evaluation of Higher education in UK is very well developed. There exist several 
mechanisms for this evaluation: 
a)  The Funding Bodies have established a system of subject review of teaching and 
learning in both the new and existing universities for each subject. The subject reviews 
included observation of teaching and were carried out by panels comprising mainly 
senior academic staff appointed by the Funding Bodies. The functions of subject 
review and audit were later managed by the Quality Assurance Agency. 
b)  Research Assessment Exercise (already mentioned) evaluates the Research being done 
in each institution.  
 
The results of the evaluation are regularly published under Teaching Quality Information 
(TQI). The purpose of TQI is to make available accurate and up-to-date information about 
quality and standards to potential students and other stakeholders, such as employers. The 
TQI consists of quantitative and qualitative data published for each HEFCE funded 
institution.  
 
The results of the RAE are also publicly available. 
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Portugal appears in our analysis as a poor performer, both when we consider only research 
outputs and only teaching outputs, as can observed in Figure 18. Other countries have similar 
performances like Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, and Spain. It is important to analyze 
closely one of these underperforming countries to identify the conditions that contribute to the 
inefficient use of resources. We analyze the case of Portugal.   
 
Brief characterization of the Tertiary education system in Portugal  
 
Analysis of the data 
 
Some analysis of the data may provide insights on why Portugal is not able to obtain high 
levels of efficiency.  
 
In what concerns inputs we observed that Academic staff per 1000 inhabitants is above 
average (2.0/1.9). On the contrary the number of students per 1000 inhabitants is a lot below 
average, which implies that there is a low ratio of Students per Academic Staff. Although this 
could be considered as a positive feature for producing graduates, observing the outputs we 
have precisely the opposite: Portugal graduates an average of 5.2 individuals per 1000 
inhabitants, a low number compared to the average (6.9). Also concerning the indicator of 
Graduates per Academic Staff Portugal fairs poorly (2.573 as compared to an average of 
3.599). So, we have that a high number of academics per student produce a small number of 
graduates. Moreover, quality indicators also show that graduates of Portuguese institutions are 
not particularly perceived as high quality by recruiters (standardized recruiter review places 
Portugal in the middle of the rankings).    
 
These results can be explained by the a priori low quality of students as indicated by PISA 
scores, where Portugal is placed in the second last position (last position is occupied by 
Romania).    
 
Considering the second output of Tertiary Institutions, research, Portugal has 0.42 
Publications per 1000 inhabitants, a value which is below average (0.541). Although these 
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quality of research. Portugal occupies the 17
th position in the ISI citation index.  
 
Regarding the explanatory factors found relevant for efficiency, we find that Portugal has the 
highest scores for the Funding Rules Indicator signifying that funds are allocated effectively.  
However Portugal appears third from last in the Evaluation Indicator. Regarding the Staff 
Policy Indicator, Portugal is below average, which is a reflection of the low autonomy that 
TEI have on hiring/dismissing staff, promoting and establishing incentives and salaries.   
 
Structure of institutions and funding arrangements 
 
Portugal has a binary system integrating universities and polytechnics, both public and 
private. 
 
Public universities have pedagogical, scientific, and financial autonomy. Although with 
increasing importance, research in universities is still relatively undervalued in comparison 
with teaching. Polytechnics are expected to have stronger vocational character than 
universities and to develop applied research activities, with closer ties to regional and local 
authorities. Polytechnics are also expected to play a role in regional development.
40 
 
FIGURE 26 - EVOLUTION OF THE OVERALL NUMBER OF STUDENTS 
(GRADUATE AND POST-GRADUATE)  
ENROLLED IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN PORTUGAL, 1990/91 – 2005/06 
 
Source: OECD-Thematic Review of Tertiary education 
Country Background Report: Portugal 
                                                 
40 This explains why the legislation imposes that local authorities play a role in the polytechnics’ governance 
bodies and that these institutions can set a number of vacancies for students from the respective region. 
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The expenditure on PGD in Portugal as a percentage of GDP is slightly above average 
(around 5%). Universities also obtain funds non-public sources, namely fees, earned income 
and investment, as can be observed in Figure 27. 




The relative weight of different types of inco
higher education institutions 2004
 
Source: OECD-Thematic Review of Tertiary education 
- Country Background Report: Portugal 
 
Non-government funding constitutes around 40% of total income, 25% of it coming from 
fees.  
 
Governance and regulatory framework 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the system of governance and regulation in higher 
education in Portugal. It also seeks to present significant policy measures that ensure the links 
between the parts of the system. 
1)  The government through the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education is 
responsible for establishing the macro level policies for science, technology and 
higher education. The Ministry has several policy tools to steer and manage the 
research and higher education system.  
a.  the most important are the control over the distribution of resources (both the 
current yearly budget as well as the budget for investments in new buildings),  
b.  the definition of research priorities,  
c.  the power of decision about the creation of new institutions (both public and 
private),  
d.  the control of the number of the academic and non-academic staff of public 
institutions, 
  91e.  the decision on new proposals for study programmes made by public 
polytechnics and the private sector,  
f.  the determination and setting of the numerus clausus system that allows for the 
control of the size of the system.  
g.  negotiating collectively the salaries of academic and non-academic staffs of 
public institutions, who are civil servants. 
2)  Public institutions can determine study programmes including curriculum content, 
staff recruitment and promotion, the internal distribution of resources and have degree 
granting power. Public universities have additional autonomy as they can decide on 
the creation of new study programmes. 
3)  Private institutions have complete discretion over their resources, staff recruitment 
including work and salary conditions. 
4)  The Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), created in 1995, has the mission 
of mission of promoting the advancement of scientific and technological knowledge in 
Portugal. It exploits and promotes the opportunities with the potential to meet the 
highest international standards for the creation of knowledge in different domains. 
FCT is currently dependent on the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher 
Education. FCT’s mission is: 
a.  promotion of advanced human resources training, through the continued 
funding of postgraduate awards, mainly for the preparation of doctorates and 
post-doctoral research;  
b.  funding of scientific research and technological development projects in all 
scientific areas;  
c.  support for the development and management of R&D infrastructures;  
d.  promotion of the mobility of researchers;  
e.  promotion of scientific communication through the funding of a series of 
activities aimed at promoting communication between scientists and 
disseminating the national scientific production. This includes support for 
participation at scientific meetings, production of scientific periodical and non-
periodical publications and funding of scientific societies. 
 
FCT’s mission is mainly carried out through the award of funding, decided upon after 
considering the merits of the proposals submitted for its approval, which are usually 
promoted by scientific institutions, research teams or duly qualified citizens.  
  92System’s  weaknesses 
 
1)  Lack of effective regulation:  
The system grew without adequate regulation, resulting in a network of institutions 
and study programmes that in most cases do not correspond to the government 
priorities (to increase the number of graduates in key social and economic areas 
relevant for the country’s development, to increase the diversity of higher education 
provision, to ensure a balanced geographical provision of higher education and to 
open the system to students from all socio-economic backgrounds).  
2)  Contradictions between the increasing autonomy conceded to the institutions and the 
traditionally centralized and over-bureaucratic system.  
3)  Little coordination between the different sectors of the higher education system 
(universities and polytechnics, public and private institutions) and between institutions 
in the same sector. 
4)  Historical organizational issues. Previous to 1974, higher education was little 
developed and access to it was not broad. In the aftermath of the revolution there was 
an uncontrolled expansion of enrolments and the system became increasingly difficult 
to manage. A consequence was the hiring of a large number of academics, some of 
which lacking the qualities for the enhancement of appropriate research and teaching. 
The organisational problems were exacerbated by lack of tradition in evaluation and 
accountability, which made it quite difficult to assess reforms and their effectiveness. 
5)  Deficient system of incentives for academics. Civil servants have their salary levels 
collectively set and never individually negotiated. Financial incentives or benefits 
such as bonuses are not available. Reward systems are quiescent and competition 
reduced to limited promotion opportunities at the higher levels of the career structure. 
To become a tenured faculty member, it is necessary to be hired in the academic 
career, to hold a PhD degree (universities) or a master degree (polytechnics), and to 
have some professional activity (usually 5 years) in teaching and research activities. 
University staff have an extremely high teaching load (6 to 9 hours a week), as 
compared to other countries in our study. 
6)  Low qualification of academic staff. Although increasing, the percentage of academic 
staff with a PhD is still low by international standards.  
7)  Poor graduation rates. Graduation rates are a measure of the success of education 
programmes and of pedagogical efficiency. There are several social, economic, 
  93psychological, and organisational reasons for not completing higher education. A 
relevant one is the access system to higher education based on numerus clausus, which 
often implies students to enrol in degrees, which are far from their study interests. 
Another reason concerns low levels of attainment in secondary education. 
 
Explanatory factors for efficiency 
 
1.  Staff Policy 
1.1. Hiring/Firing 
1.1.1.  Autonomy to hire and dismiss academic staff  
 
There are hiring restrictions in place on the number of permanent staff. Staff increase will 
usually require the consent of the Ministry of Finances, which may be difficult to obtain in 
periods of financial stringency. Moreover, the academic, administrative and technical staffs in 
the different scales (full professor, associated professor, administrator, etc.) are set by law in 
all public higher education institutions. 
 
In contrast, private institutions have complete autonomy on personnel matters, namely in what 
the nature and duration of contracts is concerned. 
 
1.2. Wages 
1.2.1.  Autonomy to set wages 
 
All members of the academic staff in public universities and public polytechnics are civil 
servants, having their salary levels collectively set and never individually negotiated. 
Financial incentives or benefits such as bonuses are not available, so that competition is 
reduced to limited promotion opportunities at the higher levels of the career structure.  
 
In contrast, private institutions can negotiate salary levels.  
 
2.  Output Flexibility 
2.1. Course content and exams 
2.1.1.  Autonomy to set course content 
 
  94The autonomy of public universities is sanctioned by the Constitution and the University 
Autonomy Act (Law 108/88) in principle confers public universities a high degree of 
autonomy, including pedagogical, scientific, financial autonomy and all the buildings have 
been transferred to the ownership of the institutions. 
  
The University Autonomy Act (1988) and the Polytechnics Autonomy Act (1990) granted 
significant levels of autonomy to the public higher education institutions, especially to 
universities. 
 
Universities have the right to create, suspend, and cancel courses; to design study 
programmes and subject contents, to define educational methods, select methods of 
evaluation, and new pedagogical experiments; the freedom in teaching and learning. 
 
Still, new degrees must be registered with the Ministry. Registration can only be rejected if 
the degrees are considered illegal (for instance because of duration or number of credits). 
 
Public polytechnics are less autonomous, being required to ask for prior Ministry approval to 
create, suspend, or cancel study programmes 
 
Private institutions of higher education have a high degree of autonomy, but are still obliged 
to get permission from the Ministry before starting any new degree or changing their study 
programmes. 
 
2.2. Offer of short studies 
2.2.1.  Do tertiary education institutions offer short study programmes (max. duration 
below 3 years)?  
 
Short cycle technological specialisation courses were recently strengthened but they are still 
not well established. 
 
2.3. Student Choice 
2.3.1.  Do tertiary education institutions offer a range of courses within each study 
programme among which students can choose?  
 
  95In Portugal, the study programmes have been officially organised in credits since 1980, but 
only recently has this system become compulsory. Moreover, in many cases, assignment of 
credits to a course tends to be based on a rather rigid way of counting the number of 
classroom hours of teaching, without consideration for the student’s actual workload. Year-
by-year syllabus of courses is often established rigidly for each programme, so that students 
are not allowed to stray away from this fixed curriculum. The number of optional credits is 
very small and closely related to the programme main theme and in general choice may take 
place only in the last year of the programme. 
 
2.3.2.  Do tertiary education institutions admit part-time learners, distance-learners, 
and learners with professional experience (outside the usual enrolment 
requirements)? 
 
Portuguese institutions admit part-time learners and working students, even though the 
number of students that fall in these categories is quite low. Moreover, the Open University 
for long-distance learning has long been created. Still, lifelong education is still a relatively 
underdeveloped area of the Portuguese education system.  
 
Until 2005, students over 25 years of age and without formal qualifications could enter higher 
education by sitting in special entrance examinations. Since the number of students using this 
alternative entrance road was very limited − representing only 1% of total first year 
enrolments in 2004-05 −, in 2006, the government reduced the age criterion to 23 years to 
encourage candidates to higher education. 
 
Apart from the special entrance examinations, institutions do not admit students from non-
traditional access routes, and there is no tradition in the area of recognition of informal 
training activities. 
 
2.4. Regional Mobility 
2.4.1.  What is the percentage of students enrolled into tertiary education institutions 
outside their region of high-school graduation?  
 
Student mobility in Portugal is rather low and the percentage of students living with parents 
remains high. In a similar way, occupancy of student residences covers only about 4% of the 




One factor that has contributed to the reduced mobility (after admission in a higher education 
institution) is the existing limit to the transfer of students between programmes between 
different higher education institutions, which results from the generalised numerus clausus 
system. In general, every year each institution opens only a limited number of vacancies for 
transfers between programmes and between institutions and students enter a competition to 
fill these vacancies.  
 
2.5. Existence of numerus clausus 
2.5.1.  Are there academic fields into which entry is restricted or rationed by 
national/regional regulations? 
 
In Portugal, there exists a generalized system of numerus clausus that allows the state to 
determine the maximum number of enrolments in each scientific or professional area. 
 
3.  Evaluation 
 
3.1. Institutional evaluation 
3.1.1.  Evaluation by a government-funded agency 
 
Quality assessment of research centres and their activity is under the supervision of FCT (the 
Foundation for Science and Technology). FCT is currently dependent on the Ministry of 
Science, Technology, and Higher Education and its mission is to promote the advancement of 
scientific and technological knowledge in Portugal. One of FCT’s tasks is to gather 
independent panels of international experts to assess the quality and productivity of research. 
 
The implementation of this assessment model took place in 1996. The third assessment 
exercise took place in 2002-2004, focusing on the activities carried out in the period 1999-01, 
as well as on the activity plans. One hundred and eighty international experts, including some 
                                                 
41 Data taken from OECD Thematic Review of Tertiary Education – Country Background Report: Portugal, 
2006. 
  97Portuguese experts working in foreign institutions, made up the panels responsible for the 
evaluation. 
 
3.2. Stakeholder evaluation  
3.2.1.  Students’ evaluation 
 
Every semester, a large survey among students in tertiary education programmes is conducted 
in most universities. Students assess the quality of their programme and teaching on a 
standardised number of topics.  
 
3.3. Are the results of the quality assessments to be made publicly available? 
 
The reports produced by the assessment panels organised by FCT and the units’ replies are all 
made public through the Internet. Funding by the FCT continues to be based on the 
assessment evaluation and the rating attributed to the unit. 
 
4.   Funding rules 
 
4.1. Public funding 
 
Public funding for higher education teaching and research activities consists of two main 
mechanisms: 
-  Public funding for higher education institutions: 
•  Direct basic funding to public institutions for teaching (through a funding 
formula); 
•  Contractual funding to public institutions (through contracts for specific 
issues); 
•  Direct funding to students (social support of individual grants); 
•  Indirect funding to students (includes meals, accommodation, sports and 
healthcare). 
-  Public funding for science and technology: 
  98•  Direct funding to institutions through R&D units based on periodic 
evaluation (through pluriannual funding of FCT, defined upon evaluations 
every 3 years); 
•  Competitive funding for R&D activities (through projects); 
•  Competitive funding for people (through individual grants for researchers). 
 
The allocation rationale is currently both input and output-oriented and has been changing to 
become progressively performance-based. In its 2006 budget, the Government adopted a new 
formula that progressively introduced criteria related to quality and performance. Since 
nowadays higher education institutions compete for students, so that the number of students 
represents some level of performance, the new formula is based on the overall number of 
students, but includes the following quality factors: 
 
-  Qualification of teaching staff, as measured by the fraction of PhDs in the total 
number of teachers of each institution; 
 
-  Graduation rate, as measured based on two indicators: 
  the number of graduates in terms of the first cycle; 
  and the number of master and PhD degrees awarded. 
 
In addition, the formula includes the following two institutional factors to answer to specific 
characteristics of each individual institution and training area: 
-  Average personnel cost for each institution, to account for the specific 
characteristics of the teaching and non-teaching staff of each institution 
-  Specific student/teacher ratio for each scientific area. 
 
Research funding is mainly a task of FCT, depending on both output quantity and quality and, 
in some cases, negotiated on a contract basis with achievement of objectives being a 
requirement for future funding. 
  
4.2. Do the results of quality assessments have an effect on funding decisions? 
 
In the case of research, the level of funding always depends on previous assessments. 
 
  994.3. Private funding 
4.3.1.  Tuition fees and/or households  
 
Funding coming directly from the government is by far the largest funding source of 
Portuguese higher education institutions. Student fees are the third source of funding in 
importance and have presented a clear growth pattern in nominal terms in recent years, 
especially due to changes in the funding law in 1997 and 2003. However, they still play a 
small role for Portuguese public higher education institutions. 
 
4.3.2.  Business, abroad, other 
 
The second major source of funding of Portuguese higher education institutions is earned 
income (without tuition fees). This funding source has acquired a more prominent role in 
recent years and often contributes with about a quarter of the funds to many institutions, 
though its importance varies from institution to institution. Some of them, due to their 
location, prestige and disciplinary composition, are more successful in obtaining funds 
through this source. 
 
As for research, direct funding from industry exists on a small scale. 
 
5.  PISA 
 
In 2002 only 13% of the population completed upper secondary education. This low 
percentage of upper secondary graduation severely limits enrolments in higher education and 
acts as an obstacle to the adoption of organisational structures in higher education that would 
allow greater labour flexibility and adaptation, associated with increasingly competitive 
markets, and scientific development. 
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  105Appendix A – Data 
 
Remark: In the following tables, data for France, Germany, and Spain refer to public 
institutions of tertiary education. 
 
TABLE A1– ACADEMIC STAFF IN PGD INSTITUTIONS  
PER 1000 INHABITANTS 
 
      1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Austria AT  1.80 2.02  na  2.01 2.02 2.08 1.87 1.85 
Belgium BE  na na  1.61  1.75  1.64 1.71 1.72 1.71 
Bulgaria BG  na na na na na na  1.69  1.75 
Cyprus CY  na 1.30  1.22  1.29  1.39 1.58 1.70 1.57 
Czech Republic  CZ  1.42 1.38 1.39 1.33 1.40 1.40 1.50 1.47 
Denmark DK  2.17  na na na na na na na 
Estonia EE  2.15 2.34 2.24 2.44  na 2.65  2.64  2.65 
Finland FI  2.23 2.87 3.04 3.12 3.25 3.34 3.42 3.42 
France FR  2.14 1.67 1.63 1.66 1.70 1.74 1.70 1.76 
Germany DE  1.93 1.93 1.94 1.94 1.96 2.02 2.04 1.96 
Greece EL  1.31 1.37 1.43 1.70 1.49 1.72 1.86 1.91 
Hungary HU  1.70 1.80 1.81 1.91 1.97 2.01 2.06 2.10 
Ireland IE  1.95 2.04 2.06 2.34 2.46 2.74 2.89 2.31 
Italy IT  1.01 1.16 1.19 1.27 1.27 1.39 1.45 1.48 
Japan JP  0.88 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.83 
Latvia LV  1.56 1.67 1.52 1.77 1.62 1.36 1.38 1.48 
Lithuania LT  2.90 3.16 3.17  na  2.79 2.84 2.77 2.77 
Malta MT  na 0.34 na  na 1.57 1.10 1.13 1.67 
Netherlands NL  1.59 2.23 2.17 2.21 2.20 2.17 2.18 2.18 
Poland PL  1.85 na 1.93  1.96  1.99 2.04  na  2.16 
Portugal PT  na na  1.91  na na 2.06  2.01  2.02 
Romania RO  na 0.78  0.85  0.89  0.98 1.07 1.09 1.10 
Slovakia SK  1.86 1.73 1.94 1.92 2.03 2.06 2.04 2.05 
Slovenia SI  0.91 0.95 0.96 1.06 1.13 1.11 1.57 1.55 
Spain ES  1.91 2.00 2.04 2.19 2.36 2.40 2.43 2.47 
Sweden SE  3.05 2.88 3.01 3.10 3.35 3.57 3.70 3.66 
United Kingdom  UK  na 1.45  1.47  1.50  1.51 1.53 1.57 1.55 
United States  US  1.74 1.78 1.80 1.79 1.88 1.95 1.86 1.87 
Sources: OECD (Online Education Database – UOE database), Eurostat, and AMECO  
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      1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Austria AT  31.0 31.6 32.6 32.9 27.7 28.3 29.2 29.7 
Belgium BE  na 34.4  34.7  34.9  35.5 36.1 37.1 37.2 
Bulgaria BG  28.4 28.9 28.7 27.8 25.5 25.6 25.2 25.8 
Cyprus CY  na 7.4 6.6 6.2 7.3 8.1 8.4 8.5 
Czech Republic  CZ  19.9 21.4 23.3 24.0 25.2 26.3 28.9 29.9 
Denmark DK  34.6 35.7 35.4 35.6 36.5 37.4 38.3 38.4 
Estonia EE  24.1 26.8 29.6 32.3 34.9 37.4 38.6 39.6 
Finland FI  48.5 50.9 52.2 53.9 54.6 55.9 57.4 58.3 
France FR  29.4 28.8 28.4 28.1 27.7 28.7 28.9 29.1 
Germany DE  24.2 24.0 23.6 23.9 24.8 25.7 26.7 25.2 
Greece EL  34.5 35.6 38.7 43.7 48.2 50.9 54.0 58.3 
Hungary HU  24.8 27.3 30.1 32.4 34.9 38.5 41.8 43.2 
Ireland IE  36.4 37.7 40.1 40.9 42.1 42.7 43.1 41.6 
Italy IT  28.6 27.7 29.1 29.6 30.3 31.1 32.0 32.2 
Japan JP  6.6 6.7 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.3 6.4 
Latvia LV  26.4 30.7 33.7 37.7 38.4 39.5 40.8 41.0 
Lithuania LT  26.4 29.5 33.5 37.5 41.0 46.1 49.6 53.0 
Malta MT  na 14.9  16.2  18.9  18.3 22.5 19.6 23.4 
Netherlands NL  29.4 29.7 30.6 31.4 32.0 32.5 33.4 34.6 
Poland PL  24.8 27.4 29.9 33.3 35.8 37.2 38.3 39.2 
Portugal PT  22.7 23.5 24.9 26.6 27.5 27.8 27.5 26.8 
Romania RO  11.1 12.4 14.4 17.1 20.0 23.2 24.9 26.7 
Slovakia SK  20.9 22.8 25.2 26.8 28.3 29.4 30.6 33.7 
Slovenia SI  34.2 39.6 41.7 45.4 49.2 49.6 50.6 53.5 
Spain ES  39.2 39.5 39.8 39.1 38.3 37.9 37.2 36.1 
Sweden SE  31.7 37.8 39.1 40.2 42.9 46.3 47.8 47.3 
United Kingdom  UK  33.1 35.5 34.4 35.0 37.8 38.4 37.6 38.0 
United States  US  35.5 35.0 34.4 35.3 42.4 43.8 43.7 43.7 
Sources: OECD (Online Education Database – UOE database), Eurostat, and AMECO  
  107TABLE A3 – EXPENDITURE IN PGD INSTITUTIONS  
IN REAL EUROS PPS PER CAPITA 
        1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005 
Austria AT  333.00 343.55 302.23 291.09 277.45 284.49  310.69  336.52 
Belgium BE  100.06 277.90 309.15 323.42 326.91 310.05  295.81  302.31 
Bulgaria BG  na  55.82 61.84 65.30 68.82 70.78  68.83  71.40 
Cyprus CY  na na na na na na  na  na 
Czech Republic  CZ  94.85  101.84 105.93 116.93 125.26 140.97  150.27  154.06 
Denmark DK  353.11 369.98 391.59 447.55 475.05 421.15  451.80  433.81 
Estonia EE  na na na na na na  na  127.70 
Finland FI  329.07 365.24 379.78 374.24 383.89 382.58  409.86  401.70 
France FR  203.47 210.55 218.03 217.80 219.30 250.23  255.29  260.24 
Germany DE  211.34 220.81 221.74 222.33 229.62 246.80  245.72  242.69 
Greece EL  156.45 137.00 123.13 168.22 193.77 200.54  239.22  273.17 
Hungary HU  93.17 99.54  117.82  125.26  144.12 159.31  135.54  143.31 
Ireland IE  276.02 307.81 361.31 327.93 323.18 301.65  319.73  328.32 
Italy IT  162.76 181.29 197.72 215.16 210.59 215.24  187.41  196.67 
Japan JP  94.48  103.32 109.20 109.59 106.10 116.31  120.88  112.55 
Latvia LV  na na na na na na  na  na 
Lithuania LT  na  61.18 57.65 92.52 98.72 117.07  121.27  129.03 
Malta MT  na 73.40  79.88  105.55  108.77 91.07  91.30  77.98 
Netherlands NL  257.55 293.11 303.13 320.10 317.30 314.09  325.37  337.93 
Poland PL  92.28 80.17 66.72 93.94  114.98 118.62  126.94  145.69 
Portugal PT  130.66 141.57 147.96 156.82 145.98 158.63  159.84  178.97 
Romania RO  na na na na na na  na  na 
Slovakia SK  na  73.06 74.30 89.91 90.87 98.13  123.84  111.64 
Slovenia SI  na na na na na na  220.03  235.64 
Spain ES  160.78 170.00 186.94 197.08 205.66 207.64  208.06  208.76 
Sweden SE  336.81 361.51 390.30 384.39 403.34 415.18  424.76  409.45 
United Kingdom  UK  211.85 213.70 220.41 235.55 252.65 250.65  256.74  314.09 
United States  US  398.14 423.53 446.63 485.43 515.86 535.91  486.61  518.91 
Sources: OECD (Online Education Database – UOE database), Eurostat, and AMECO  
 
 
  108TABLE A4 – GRADUATES IN PGD INSTITUTIONS PER 1000 INHABITANTS 
      1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Austria AT  3.55 2.24 3.34 3.60 2.61 3.86 4.05 4.27 
Belgium BE  na na  6.77  6.96  7.20 7.31 7.53 7.75 
Bulgaria BG  4.56 4.81 5.13 5.34 5.64 5.25 5.07 4.98 
Cyprus CY  na 1.77  1.77  1.47  1.63 1.42 1.42 1.56 
Czech Republic  CZ  2.90 3.30 3.60 4.12 3.98 4.47 5.08 5.07 
Denmark DK  na 5.92  6.39  7.47  7.44 8.07 8.79 9.35 
Estonia EE  na na na na na na na  6.97 
Finland FI  8.37 7.88 7.72 7.31 7.44 7.74 7.90 7.86 
France FR  7.20 7.25 7.18 7.18 7.41 8.02 7.95 8.97 
Germany DE  4.00 3.91 3.77 3.69 3.65 3.76 3.93 4.10 
Greece EL  na na na  3.56  3.98 na 4.47  5.51 
Hungary HU  4.38 4.81 5.93 5.76 6.23 6.78 6.82 7.42 
Ireland IE  9.72 10.27  10.61  11.39  10.88 12.80 12.93 13.48 
Italy IT  2.64 2.82 3.19 3.37 3.63 4.11 5.32 6.20 
Japan JP  4.00 4.17 4.36 4.26 4.11 3.95 3.90 3.42 
Latvia LV  3.92 4.68 5.63 7.44 6.58 6.89 7.62 8.19 
Lithuania LT  5.26 6.00 6.93 7.58 8.20 9.48  10.34  11.24 
Malta MT  3.47 5.10 5.14 4.75 5.17 5.38  na  6.79 
Netherlands NL  5.55 5.06 4.83 5.24 5.47 5.67 6.12 6.71 
Poland PL  5.82 5.51 6.62 8.16 8.70 9.07 9.21 9.37 
Portugal PT  4.35 4.41 4.48 4.63 4.69 4.75 4.77 5.21 
Romania RO  2.09 1.93 2.16 2.44 3.21 4.92 5.35 5.65 
Slovakia SK  na 4.03  4.29  4.98  5.37 6.32 6.73 6.93 
Slovenia SI  4.03 4.16 4.51 4.61 5.43 5.24 5.94 5.64 
Spain ES  5.54 6.04 5.80 6.06 6.24 6.31 6.21 5.89 
Sweden SE  4.24 4.72 5.12 5.19 5.50 5.91 6.41 6.69 
United Kingdom  UK  7.97 8.11 8.56 9.33 9.48 10.10 9.95 10.51 
United States  US  5.65 5.37 5.73 5.75 5.96 6.32 6.52 6.61 
Sources: OECD (Online Education Database – UOE database), Eurostat, and AMECO  
 
  109TABLE A5 – PUBLICATIONS IN PGD INSTITUTIONS PER 1000 INHABITANTS 
      1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Austria AT  0.69 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.84 0.87 
Belgium BE  0.71 0.75 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.86 0.90 0.96 
Bulgaria BG  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 
Cyprus CY  0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.24 
Czech Republic  CZ  0.17 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.30 
Denmark DK  0.78 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.90 1.01 1.03 1.00 
Estonia EE  0.26 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.39 0.45 0.50 
Finland FI  1.06 1.10 1.15 1.18 1.18 1.24 1.26 1.26 
France FR  0.30 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.34 
Germany DE  0.52 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.59 
Greece EL  0.26 0.26 0.29 0.35 0.41 0.44 0.50 0.54 
Hungary HU  0.14 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.31 
Ireland IE  0.47 0.47 0.51 0.53 0.60 0.61 0.73 0.78 
Italy IT  0.36 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.49 
Japan JP  0.35 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.40 
Latvia LV  0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 
Lithuania LT  0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.19 
Malta MT  0.09 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.14 
Netherlands NL  0.84 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.96 0.96 
Poland PL  0.11 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.24 
Portugal PT  0.19 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.40 0.42 
Romania RO  0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Slovakia SK  0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.20 
Slovenia SI  0.37 0.45 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.60 0.59 0.72 
Spain ES  0.35 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.49 
Sweden SE  1.09 1.14 1.17 1.26 1.37 1.38 1.42 1.52 
United Kingdom  UK  0.71 0.73 0.77 0.82 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.92 
United States  US  0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.53 
Sources: ISI Web of Knowledge and AMECO 
  110TABLE A6 – ISI CITATION INDEX 
      1998-2002  1999-2003  2000-2004  2001-2005 
Austria AT  4.35 4.66 4.77 5.16 
Belgium BE  4.27 4.72 4.74 4.98 
Bulgaria BG  1.89 2.30 2.49 2.63 
Cyprus CY  3.13 2.94 2.50 2.33 
Czech Republic  CZ  2.33 2.53 2.56 2.90 
Denmark DK  4.66 4.36 4.95 5.37 
Estonia EE  2.77 2.92 2.96 3.12 
Finland FI  4.71 4.90 4.97 5.14 
France FR  3.67 3.84 3.92 4.21 
Germany DE  4.27 4.49 4.51 4.86 
Greece EL  2.20 2.32 2.43 2.71 
Hungary HU  2.47 2.78 3.15 3.54 
Ireland IE  3.35 3.55 3.61 3.85 
Italy IT  3.87 3.99 3.96 4.12 
Japan JP  3.66 3.85 3.89 4.10 
Latvia LV  1.74 1.86 2.13 2.21 
Lithuania LT  1.92 1.94 1.88 1.76 
Malta MT  5.76 2.48 2.17 2.45 
Netherlands NL  5.17 5.37 5.25 5.51 
Poland PL  2.74 2.82 2.82 2.98 
Portugal PT  2.69 2.92 2.91 3.07 
Romania RO  1.45 1.52 1.58 1.63 
Slovakia SK  1.82 2.04 2.02 2.23 
Slovenia SI  2.08 2.03 2.11 2.39 
Spain ES  3.22 3.33 3.30 3.46 
Sweden SE  4.57 4.56 4.68 5.10 
United Kingdom  UK  4.75 4.79 4.86 5.00 
United States  US  5.00 5.16 5.19 5.36 
Sources: ISI Web of Knowledge 
 
 
  111TABLE A7 – STANDARDISED RECRUITER REVIEW AND PEER REVIEW INDEXES 




Austria AT  1.26 1.59 
Belgium BE  1.38 1.77 
Czech Republic  CZ  1.00 1.00 
Denmark DK  1.00 1.00 
Finland FI  1.03 1.08 
France FR  1.30 1.75 
Germany DE  1.00 1.00 
Greece EL  1.31 2.00 
Ireland IE  1.14 1.23 
Italy IT  1.20 1.38 
Japan JP  1.10 1.07 
Netherlands NL  1.00 1.00 
Poland PL  2.00 1.94 
Portugal PT  1.08 1.15 
Romania RO  1.47 1.58 
Spain ES  1.00 1.00 
Sweden SE  1.00 1.00 
United Kingdom  UK  1.00 1.00 
United States  US  1.50 1.82 
 
  112TABLE A8 – SCORES FOR THE  MAIN CATEGORIES OF THE COMPOSITE INDICATOR 









Flexibility  Accountability Evaluation  Funding 
Rules 
Austria AT  6.80 2.80  7.70  10.00  6.60 5.30 5.10  5.50 
Belgium BE  5.20 2.53  6.10  6.97  7.37 5.60 5.43  5.80 
Czech Republic  CZ  7.90 7.50  6.30  10.00  8.20 5.30 6.60  4.00 
Denmark DK  7.70 7.00  6.20  10.00  7.30 5.00 4.60  5.30 
Finland FI  7.40 7.10  7.70  7.50  8.40 5.10 4.00  6.20 
France FR  3.80 2.80  6.80  1.80  6.40 6.10 5.60  6.60 
Germany DE  5.80 2.80  7.20  7.50  3.00 6.10 6.90  5.20 
Greece EL  1.90 1.70  0.90  3.20  3.60 3.50 2.30  4.60 
Hungary HU  6.80 8.90  8.50  3.20  7.30 6.30 8.30  4.30 
Ireland IE  7.80 5.50  10.00  7.90  6.60 6.30 6.70  5.90 
Italy IT  6.20 3.70  7.00  7.90  6.40 6.00 6.80  5.20 
Japan JP  8.20 6.60  8.20  10.00  9.10 5.10 6.20  3.90 
Netherlands NL 6.30 1.30  7.70  10.00  5.90 6.30 7.50  5.10 
Portugal PT  6.20 3.90  7.20  7.40  7.30 6.20 4.60  7.80 
Romania RO  6.90 6.60  5.80  8.30  5.00 4.20 5.30  3.10 
Slovakia SK  8.40 6.70  8.50  10.00  8.20 4.70 6.50  2.90 
Spain ES  7.60 10.00  7.90  4.90  5.70 5.70 6.50  4.80 
Sweden SE  8.40 8.90  6.20  10.00  5.50 5.60 6.50  4.60 
United Kingdom  UK  7.80 6.70  6.80  10.00  8.20 6.60 7.70  5.50 
United States  US  8.20 6.10  8.50  10.00  7.00 5.10 6.60  3.60 
Source: Oliveira Martins et al. (2007) 
TABLE A9 – PISA 2000  
      PISA 2000 
Austria AT  514 
Belgium BE  508 
Czech Republic  CZ  500 
Denmark DK  497 
Finland FI  540 
France FR  507 
Germany DE  487 
Greece EL  460 
Hungary HU  488 
Ireland IE  514 
Italy IT  473 
Japan JP  543 
Netherlands NL  525 a) 
Portugal PT  456 
Romania RO  410 a) 
Slovakia SK  482 a) 
Spain ES  487 
Sweden SE  513 
United Kingdom  UK  528,00 
United States  US  499,00 
a) drawn from PISA 2006 
Source: PISA publications 2000. 
  113Appendix B - Data sources and remarks 
 
 
Academic Staff  
 
Main Sources: OECD (Online Education Database – UOE database, Dataset: Educational 
Personnel) and Eurostat (Dataset: Teachers (ISCED 0-4) and academic staff (ISCED 5-6) by 
employment status (full-time, part-time, full-time equivalence) and sex).  
 
Remarks: Most data was taken from the OECD dataset, which classifies academic personnel 
into public, government-dependent private, and independent private institutions, with the 
exceptions that follow. For some years and countries for which no data was available from 
OECD - namely Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal in 2003 and 
2005, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia - some numbers were recovered from Eurostat, where 
only data for academic staff in all institutions is available, according to the methodology that 
follows. In the case of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, and Slovenia, 
countries where private independent universities are relevant, we computed the proportion of 
academic staff in PGD universities using the weight of the public sector as follows: 
. ) (
students all
ns institutio PGD in students
Eurostat es universiti all in staff Academic ×  
 
Students in PGD Private Institutions:  
 
Source: OECD (Online Education Database – UOE database, Dataset: Students enrolled by 
type of institution) and Eurostat (Dataset: Students by ISCED level, type of institution 
(private or public) and study intensity (full-time, part-time)) 
 
Remarks: Most data was extracted from OECD, except for the following. Data for Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia was drawn form 
Eurostat. 
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Expenditure/financial data 
 
Total Expenditure on PGD Institutions in Percentage of GDP: 
 
Source: Eurostat (Dataset: Expenditure on public educational institutions). 
 




Source: This data has been constructed using the dataset Expenditure by nature and resource 
category from the UOE data collection, as well as data on population, ECU-EUR average 
exchange rates, GDP purchasing power parities, and the euro area price deflator of the gross 
domestic product at market prices of the year 2000 obtained from AMECO Database.  
 
Total Public Expenditure on Tertiary Education 
 
Source: OECD (Online Education Database – UOE database). 
 
Total Public Expenditure for Educational Institutions (Tertiary Education) 
 
Source: OECD (Online Education Database – UOE database). 
 
Remarks: Though less comprehensive than the preceding variable, it presents the advantage 




Graduates in PGD Institutions:  
 
Source: OECD (Online Education Database – UOE database, Dataset: Graduates by field of 
education and Graduates by age), Eurostat (Dataset: Graduates by ISCED level, type of 
institution (private or public), age and gender), and UIS (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
  115Dataset: Graduates by broad field of education in tertiary education). Data for France and 
Germany only includes public institutions. 
  
Remarks: Most data was taken from the OECD dataset, which divides graduates into ISCED 
5B and ISCED 5A and 6, and finally ISCED 6 in public and private institutions. Data for 
graduates in PGD institutions is scarce.  
To overcome the problem of lacking of data, we have constructed a proxy of the number of 
graduates in PGD institutions using the data of Students in ISCED 5 and 6 in PGD institutions 
and Students ISCED 5 and 6 in all institutions. Namely, we computed the proportion of 
students in PGD institutions over the students in all institutions and used this proportion to 
obtain an estimate of the graduates in PGD institutions. The same methodology was used to 
recover graduates in ISCED 5 and ISCED 6 separately in PGD institutions.  
For those years and countries for which no data was available from OECD, numbers were 
recovered from Eurostat (namely for Greece from 2001 to 2002, Portugal from 1998 to 2002, 
Slovenia from 1998 to 2005, and the US for 2002) and from the UIS (namely for Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania). 
 
THES - QS recruiter survey ranking: 
 
Source: THES (Times Higher Education Supplement) - QS (Quacquarelli Symonds) World 
University Rankings. Data available online: www.topuniversities.com.  
 
Remarks: The recruiter review is only one of the indicators used by THES - QS to rank 
universities. Other indicators concern the peer review (see below), international staff, 
international students, the staff/student ratio, and citations of academic work. 
 
THES - QS peer survey ranking: 
 
Source: THES (Times Higher Education Supplement) - QS (Quacquarelli Symonds) World 
University Rankings. Data available online: www.topuniversities.com.  
 
Remarks: The peer review is only one of the indicators used by THES - QS to rank 
universities. Other indicators concern the employer review (see above), international staff, 
international students, the staff/student ratio, and citations of academic work. 
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Published articles: 
 
Source: ISI Web of Knowledge, Thomson Scientific, The Thomson Corporation. Data 
available online to ISI subscribers (www.isiwebofknowledge.com). 
 
Remarks: The ISI Web of Science Database includes the Science Citation Index expanded 
(available data from 1900), the Social Sciences Citation Index (available data from 1956) and 
the Arts & Humanities Citation Index (available data from 1975). Data were collected from 




Source:  ISI Web of Knowledge, Thomson Scientific, The Thomson Corporation. Data 
available online to ISI subscribers (www.isiwebofknowledge.com):  
 
Remarks: The ISI Web of Science Database includes the Science Citation Index expanded 
(available data from 1900), the Social Sciences Citation Index (available data from 1956), and 
the Arts & Humanities Citation Index (available data from 1975). Data were collected from 
1998 onwards.  
 
Institutional and environment data 
 
Supply of tertiary education (STE) 
 
Source: Oliveira Martins et al. (2007) 
 
Remarks: The indicator has been constructed on the basis of a questionnaire sent to OECD 
member countries, 28 of which have provided answers. We extended coverage to the 
remaining countries considered in our study (see Table 1) and had positive replies from 
Cyprus and Romania. For this purpose, we have sought and obtained permission from the 
OECD Economics Department to use their questionnaire.
42  
 
                                                 
42 We are grateful to Joaquim Oliveira Martins for his help in obtaining this permission. 
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Our main source for macroeconomic variables including population is the AMECO database, 
Spring 2008 release. Data for activity rates, employment rates, and unemployment rates were 
drawn from Eurostat. 
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  129Appendix D - Data Envelopment Analysis alternative models 
 
TABLE D1: MODEL DEA1 – TEACHING 
(RESEARCH IS NOT CONSIDERED) 
INPUT ORIENTED DEA 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coef. Rank  Peers  Coef.  Rank  Peers 
Austria  0.450 24 Japan,  Romania  0.456 20 Japan 
Belgium  0.755 7 Japan,  UK  0.726 6 UK,  Japan 
Bulgaria  0.521 15 Romania,  Japan  0.517 17 Japan 
Cyprus  1.000 1 Cyprus  0.870 4 Japan 
Czech Republic  0.624 10 Romania,  Japan  0.618 13 Japan 
Denmark  0.537  14  Ireland, Japan, UK  0.637 11  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Estonia  0.411 26 UK,  Japan  0.360 27 Japan,  UK 
Finland  0.498  18  Ireland, Japan, UK  0.417 24  Ireland, Japan, UK 
France  0.591  12  Japan, UK  0.644 10  Japan, UK 
Germany  0.456 23 Romania,  Japan  0.445 22 Japan 
Greece  0.596 11 Japan,  Romania  0.511 18 Japan 
Hungary  0.488 20 Romania,  Japan  0.466 19 Japan,  UK 
Ireland  1.000 1 Ireland  1.000 1 Ireland 
Italy  0.739 8 Japan,  Romania  0.636 12  Japan 
Japan  1.000 1 Japan  1.000 1 Japan 
Latvia  0.544 13 Japan,  Romania  0.668 7 Japan,  UK 
Lithuania  0.294 28 UK,  Japan  0.402 25 Japan,  UK 
Malta  0.639 9 Romania,  Japan  0.650 9 Japan 
Netherlands  0.515  16  Japan, UK  0.531 15  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Poland  0.493  19  Japan, UK  0.542 14  Japan, UK 
Portugal  0.461 22 Romania,  Japan  0.438 23 Japan 
Romania  1.000 1 Romania  0.840 5 Japan 
Slovakia  0.466 21 Japan,  Romania  0.448 21 Japan,  UK 
Slovenia  0.898 6 Romania,  Japan  0.664 8 Japan 
Spain  0.441 25 Japan,  Romania  0.389 26 Japan,  UK 
Sweden  0.335  27  Japan, UK  0.346 28  Japan, Ireland, UK 
United Kingdom  1.000 1 UK  1.000 1 UK 
United States  0.514  17  Japan, UK  0.520 16  Japan, UK 
 
  130TABLE D2: MODEL DEA1 – RESEARCH 
(TEACHING IS NOT CONSIDERED) 
OUTPUT ORIENTED DEA 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coef. Rank  Peers  Coef.  Rank  Peers 
Austria  0.256  28  Ireland, Japan  0.302  25  Ireland, Japan 
Belgium  0.688  6  Ireland, Japan, UK  0.666  4  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Bulgaria  0.313  25  Ireland, Japan, UK  0.343  20  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Cyprus  1.000 1  Cyprus  0.235  28  Ireland,  Japan 
Czech Republic  0.298  26  Ireland, Japan, UK  0.352  18  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Denmark  0.525  10  Ireland, Japan  0.614  5  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Estonia  0.437  12  Ireland, Japan  0.315  24  Ireland, Japan 
Finland  0.626 7  Ireland  0.519  8  Ireland 
France  0.529  9  Ireland, Japan  0.599  6  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Germany  0.353  18  Ireland, Japan  0.316  23  Ireland, Japan 
Greece  0.273 27  Japan,  UK  0.274  27  Ireland,  UK 
Hungary  0.323  22  Ireland, Japan  0.333  21  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland  1.000  1  Ireland 
Italy  0.333  21  Japan, UK  0.369  17  Japan, UK 
Japan  1.000 1  Japan  1.000  1  Japan,   
Latvia  0.346  20  Ireland, Japan, UK  0.469  12  Japan, UK 
Lithuania  0.368 17  Ireland,  Japan  0.398  15  Ireland 
Malta  0.429  14  Ireland, Japan  0.480  11  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Netherlands  0.508  11  Ireland, Japan  0.503  9  Ireland, Japan 
Poland  0.431  13  Ireland, Japan  0.482  10  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Portugal  0.350  19  Ireland, Japan  0.325  22  Ireland, Japan 
Romania  1.000 1  Romania  0.545  7  Japan,  UK 
Slovakia  0.316  23  Ireland, Japan  0.346  19  Ireland, Japan 
Slovenia  0.587  8  Japan, UK  0.410  13  Japan, UK 
Spain  0.315  24  Ireland, UK  0.302  25  Ireland, Japan 
Sweden  0.396 15  Ireland,  Japan  0.409  14  Ireland 
United Kingdom  1.000 1  UK  1.000  1  UK, 
United States  0.381  16  Ireland, Japan, UK  0.382  16  Ireland, UK 
 
  131TABLE D3: MODEL DEA1  
(WITHOUT ROMANIA AND CYPRUS) 
 INPUT ORIENTED DEA 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coef. Rank Peers Coef. Rank Peers 
Austria  0.777 11  UK, Netherlands, Japan  0.963 9  Neth., Denmark, Japan 
Belgium  0.846 8  Japan, UK  0.973 8  Denmark, UK, Japan 
Bulgaria  0.533 19 Japan  0.517 19 Japan 
Czech Republic  0.652 14 Japan  0.618 16 Japan 
Denmark  0.816 9  UK, Netherlands, Japan  1.000 1  Denmark 
Estonia  0.411 25 Japan,  UK  0.360 26 UK,  Japan 
Finland  1.000 1  Finland  0.975 7  UK, Ireland, Sweden 
France  0.591 17 Japan,  UK  0.644 14 UK,  Japan 
Germany  0.643 15  Netherlands, UK, Japan  0.644 14  Neth., Japan, Denmark 
Greece  0.621 16 Japan  0.511 20 Japan 
Hungary  0.497 20 Japan  0.466 21 Japan,  UK 
Ireland  1.000 1 Ireland  1.000 1 Ireland 
Italy  0.808 10  UK, Japan  0.685 10  UK, Japan 
Japan  1.000 1 Japan  1.000 1 Japan 
Latvia  0.552 18 Japan  0.668 11 Japan,  UK 
Lithuania  0.294 26  UK, Japan  0.402 24  UK, Japan 
Malta  0.657 12 Japan  0.650 13 Japan 
Netherlands  1.000 1 Netherlands  1.000 1 Neth. 
Poland  0.493 21 Japan,  UK  0.542 18 Japan,UK 
Portugal  0.471 23 Japan  0.438 23 Japan 
Slovakia  0.481 22 Japan  0.448 22 UK,  Japan 
Slovenia  0.928 7 Japan  0.664 12  Japan 
Spain  0.441 24 Japan  0.389 25 Japan,  UK 
Sweden  1.000 1 Sweden  1.000 1 Sweden 
United Kingdom  1.000 1 UK  1.000 1 UK 
United States  0.655 13  Japan, UK  0.605 17  Japan, UK 
  132TABLE D4: MODEL DEA1  
(WITHOUT ROMANIA AND CYPRUS) 
 OUTPUT ORIENTED DEA 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coef. Rank Peers Coef. Rank Peers 
Austria  0.761 9  UK, Netherlands  0.962 9  Neth., Denmark, Japan 
Belgium  0.839 8  UK, Netherlands  0.972 8  Denmark, UK, Japan 
Bulgaria  0.313 24  Ireland, Japan, UK  0.343 24  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Czech Republic  0.298 25  Ireland, Japan, UK  0.352 22  Ireland, UK, Japan 
Denmark  0.874 7 UK,  Sweden,  Netherlands  1.000 1 Denmark 
Estonia  0.460 15  UK, Ireland, Japan  0.366 21  UK, Ireland, Japan 
Finland  1.000 1 Finland  0.996 7 Ireland,  Sweden,  UK 
France  0.566 14  UK, Ireland, Japan  0.599 11  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Germany  0.649 10  Netherlands, Japan, Sweden  0.660 10  Sweden, Japan, Neth. 
Greece  0.273 26  UK, Japan  0.294 26  UK, Ireland, Sweden 
Hungary  0.323 22  Ireland, Japan  0.333 25  Ireland, UK, Japan 
Ireland  1.000 1 Ireland  1.000 1 Ireland 
Italy  0.627 11  UK, Japan  0.506 13  UK, Japan 
Japan  1.000 1 Japan  1.000 1 Japan 
Latvia  0.346 21  Ireland, Japan, UK  0.469 16  UK, Japan 
Lithuania  0.368 19 Japan,  Ireland  0.398 18 Ireland 
Malta  0.429 17  Ireland, Japan  0.480 15  Ireland, Japan, UK 
Netherlands  1.000 1 Netherlands  1.000 1 Neth. 
Poland  0.431 16  Japan,  Ireland  0.482 14  Ireland, UK, Japan 
Portugal  0.365 20  UK,  Ireland,  Japan  0.376 20  UK, Ireland, Japan 
Slovakia  0.316 23  Japan,  Ireland  0.346 23  Japan, Ireland 
Slovenia  0.593 13  UK,  Japan  0.414 17  UK, Japan 
Spain  0.382 18  UK,  Finland,  Ireland  0.382 19  UK, Ireland, Japan 
Sweden  1.000 1 Sweden  1.000 1 Sweden 
United Kingdom  1.000 1 UK  1.000 1 UK 
United States  0.598 12  UK,  Netherlands  0.550 12  UK,  Denmark 
 
  133TABLE D5: MODEL DEA2 – TEACHING 
(RESEARCH IS NOT CONSIDERED) 
INPUT ORIENTED DEA 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coef. Rank  Peers  Coef.  Rank  Peers 
Austria  0.374 22  Japan  0.437  19  Japan 
Belgium  0.691  5  Ireland, Japan  0.558  7  Ireland, Japan 
Bulgaria  0.426 21  Japan  0.486  16  Japan 
Czech Republic  0.605 7  Japan  0.531  11  Japan 
Denmark  0.436  20  Ireland, Japan  0.419  22  Ireland, Japan 
Estonia  0.519  13  Ireland, Japan  0.551  9  Ireland, Japan 
Finland  0.520  12  Ireland, Japan  0.430  20  Ireland, Japan 
France  0.617  6  Ireland, Japan  0.579  5  Ireland, Japan 
Germany  0.495 16  Japan  0.491  15  Japan 
Greece  0.516 15  Japan  0.423  21  Japan 
Hungary  0.467 19  Japan  0.471  18  Ireland,  Japan 
Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland  1.000  1  Ireland 
Italy  0.570 9  Japan  0.553  8  Japan 
Japan  1.000 1  Japan  1.000  1  Japan 
Lithuania  0.529  11  Ireland, Japan  0.542  10  Ireland, Japan 
Malta  0.860 4  Japan  0.867  3  Japan 
Netherlands  0.517  14  Ireland, Japan  0.524  13  Ireland, Japan 
Poland  0.553  10  Ireland, Japan  0.502  14  Ireland, Japan 
Portugal  0.490 17  Japan  0.486  16  Japan 
Slovakia  0.598 8  Japan  0.564  6  Ireland,  Japan 
Slovenia  0.371 23  Japan  0.394  23  Japan 
Spain  0.490 17  Japan  0.525  12  Ireland,  Japan 
Sweden  0.363  24  Ireland, Japan  0.388  24  Ireland, Japan 
United Kingdom  0.948  3  Ireland, Japan  0.778  4  Ireland, Japan 
United States  0.335  25  Ireland, Japan  0.337  25  Ireland, Japan 
  134TABLE D6: MODEL DEA2 – TEACHING 
(RESEARCH IS NOT CONSIDERED) 
OUTPUT ORIENTED DEA 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coef. Rank  Peers  Coef.  Rank  Peers 
Austria  0.225 24  Ireland,  Japan  0.213  24  Ireland 
Belgium  0.657 4  Ireland,  Japan  0.477  7  Ireland 
Bulgaria  0.284  21  Ireland, Japan  0.233  21  Ireland, Japan 
Czech Republic  0.313  20  Ireland, Japan  0.248  19  Ireland, Japan 
Denmark  0.486 9  Ireland  0.520  5  Ireland 
Estonia  0.461  12  Ireland, Japan  0.337  13  Ireland, Japan 
Finland  0.626 5  Ireland  0.519  6  Ireland 
France  0.571  7  Ireland, Japan  0.404  9  Ireland, Japan 
Germany  0.335  16  Ireland, Japan  0.224  23  Ireland, Japan 
Greece  0.273 22  Ireland,  Japan  0.205  25  Ireland 
Hungary  0.330 18  Ireland,  Japan  0.276  18  Ireland 
Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland  1.000  1  Ireland 
Italy  0.266  23  Ireland, Japan  0.289  17  Ireland, Japan 
Japan  1.000 1  Japan  1.000  1  Japan 
Lithuania  0.467 11  Ireland,  Japan  0.398  11  Ireland 
Malta  0.597  6  Ireland, Japan  0.698  3  Ireland, Japan 
Netherlands  0.468 10  Ireland,  Japan  0.403  10  Ireland 
Poland  0.495 8  Ireland,  Japan  0.395  12  Ireland 
Portugal  0.334  17  Ireland, Japan  0.241  20  Ireland, Japan 
Slovakia  0.371  15  Ireland, Japan  0.336  14  Ireland, Japan 
Slovenia  0.213 25  Ireland,  Japan  0.226  22  Ireland 
Spain  0.423  13  Ireland, Japan  0.308  15  Ireland, Japan 
Sweden  0.383 14  Ireland  0.409 8  Ireland 
United Kingdom  0.941 3  Ireland,  Japan  0.688  4  Ireland 
United States  0.319 19  Ireland  0.303  16  Ireland 
  135TABLE D7: MODEL DEA2 – RESEARCH 
(TEACHING IS NOT CONSIDERED) 
INPUT ORIENTED DEA. 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coef. Rank  Peers  Coef.  Rank  Peers 
Austria  0.707  9  UK, Japan  0.904  5  Sweden, Japan 
Belgium  0.844  7  UK, Japan  0.861  8  Sweden, Japan 
Bulgaria  0.426 23  Japan  0.486  17  Japan 
Czech Republic  0.605 12  Japan  0.531  14  Japan 
Denmark  0.656 10  Netherlands,  UK  0.721  9 Sweden,  Japan 
Estonia  0.485 21  Japan  0.515  15  Japan 
Finland  0.937 5  Sweden,  Netherlands  0.866  7  Sweden,  Japan 
France  0.490 18  Japan  0.468  19  Japan 
Germany  0.724  8  UK, Japan  0.716  10  Sweden, Japan 
Greece  0.516 15  Japan  0.423  23  Japan 
Hungary  0.467 22  Japan  0.444  20  Japan 
Ireland  0.421 24  Japan,  UK  0.640  11  Sweden,  Japan 
Italy  0.610  11  UK, Japan  0.618  12  Sweden, Japan 
Japan  1.000 1  Japan  1.000  1  Japan 
Lithuania  0.527 14  Japan  0.433  22  Japan 
Malta  0.860 6  Japan  0.867  6  Japan 
Netherlands  1.000 1  Netherlands  0.988  3  Sweden,  Japan 
Poland  0.516 15  Japan  0.403  24  Japan 
Portugal  0.490 18  Japan  0.486  17  Japan 
Slovakia  0.598 13  Japan  0.547  13  Japan 
Slovenia  0.371 25  Japan  0.394  25  Japan 
Spain  0.490 18  Japan  0.500  16  Japan 
Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden  1.000  1  Sweden 
United Kingdom  1.000 1  UK  0.962  4  Sweden,  Japan 
United States  0.492  17  UK, Japan  0.438  21  Sweden, Japan 
  136TABLE D8: MODEL DEA2 – RESEARCH 
(TEACHING IS NOT CONSIDERED) 
OUTPUT ORIENTED DEA.. 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coef. Rank  Peers  Coef.  Rank  Peers 
Austria  0.694 8  Sweden,  Netherlands  0.886  5  Sweden,  Japan 
Belgium  0.815 6  UK,  Netherlands  0.839  7  Sweden,  Japan 
Bulgaria  0.031 25  Netherlands,  UK  0.049  25  Sweden,  Japan 
Czech Republic  0.166  20  UK, Japan  0.215  19  Sweden, Japan 
Denmark  0.711 7  Sweden  0.731  8  Sweden 
Estonia  0.247  16  UK, Japan  0.331  14  Sweden, Japan 
Finland  0.992 5  Sweden  0.873  6  Sweden 
France  0.329  14  UK, Japan  0.320  15  Sweden, Japan 
Germany  0.664  9  UK, Japan  0.658  9  Sweden, Japan 
Greece  0.193  18  UK, Japan  0.258  18  Sweden, Japan 
Hungary  0.123 21  UK,  Netherlands  0.210  20  Sweden,  Japan 
Ireland  0.353 12  Sweden,  Netherlands  0.572  10  Sweden,  Japan 
Italy  0.509  10  UK, Japan  0.527  11  Sweden, Japan 
Japan  1.000 1  Japan  1.000  1  Japan 
Lithuania  0.040  24  UK, Japan  0.051  24  Sweden, Japan 
Malta  0.256  15  UK, Japan  0.135  21  Sweden, Japan 
Netherlands  1.000 1  Netherlands  0.986  3  Sweden,  Japan 
Poland  0.100  23  UK, Japan  0.110  23  Sweden, Japan 
Portugal  0.184  19  UK, Japan  0.266  17  Sweden, Japan 
Slovakia  0.120  22  UK, Japan  0.120  22  Sweden, Japan 
Slovenia  0.206 17  Sweden,  Netherlands  0.269  16  Sweden,  Japan 
Spain  0.343  13  UK, Japan  0.380  12  Sweden, Japan 
Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden  1.000  1  Sweden 
United Kingdom  1.000 1  UK  0.955  4  Sweden,  Japan 
United States  0.472 11  Sweden,  Netherlands  0.371  13  Sweden 
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Model DEA3 is an alternative DEA model where the input is real spending in PGD 
institutions measured in purchasing power standards per head of population. Results are less 
reliable than those presented in the main text as there is no control for differences in wages 
across countries.  
 
TABLE D9: MODEL DEA3  
(INPUT IS REAL SPENDING IN PPS) 
INPUT ORIENTED DEA. 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coef. Rank  Peers  Coef. Rank Peers 
Austria  0.621  17  UK, Japan  0.837 13  Sweden, Japan 
Belgium  0.789  11  UK, Japan  0.851 12  Sweden, UK, Japan 
Bulgaria  1.000 1  Bulgaria  1.000 1  Bulgaria 
Czech Republic  0.706  14  Bulgaria, Japan  0.624 19  Japan,  Bulgaria 
Denmark  0.603  18  Finland, UK  0.694 16  Sweden, UK, Japan 
Estonia  0.715  13  UK, Lith., Japan  0.858 10  Japan, UK,  Bulgaria 
Finland  1.000 1  Finland  0.989 7  Sweden,  UK,  Ireland 
France  0.535  21  UK, Lith., Japan  0.552 21  Bulgaria, UK, Ireland 
Germany  0.688  15  UK, Japan  0.711 15  Sweden, Japan 
Greece  0.512  23  Bulgaria, Japan  0.438 24  Japan,  Bulgaria 
Hungary  0.645  16  Bulgaria, Japan  0.682 17  UK,  Bulgaria, Japan 
Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland 
Italy  0.568  19  UK, Japan  0.627 18  Sweden, Japan 
Japan  1.000 1  Japan  1.000 1  Japan 
Lithuania  1.000 1  Lith.  1.000 1  Lith. 
Malta  0.777  12  Bulgaria, Japan  0.854 11  Ireland, Lith.,  Bulgaria 
Netherlands  0.974  9  Finland, UK  0.919 9  Sweden, UK, Japan 
Poland  1.000  1  Poland  0.959 8  Ireland, Lith.,  Bulgaria 
Portugal  0.551  20  Japan,  Bulgaria  0.601 20  Japan,  Bulgaria 
Slovakia  0.833  10  Bulgaria, Japan  0.781 14  Ireland,  Bulgaria, UK 
Slovenia  0.380  24  Bulgaria, Japan  0.459 23  Japan,  Bulgaria 
Spain  0.535  21  Japan, Lith.,  Bulgaria  0.548 22  UK,  Bulgaria, Japan 
Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden 
United Kingdom  1.000 1  UK  1.000 1  UK 
United States  0.355  25  UK, Japan  0.330 25  Sweden, UK, Japan 
 
  138TABLE D10: MODEL DEA3  
(INPUT IS REAL SPENDING IN PPS) 
OUTPUT ORIENTED DEA. 
Period 1 - 1998-2001  Period 2 - 2002-2005 
   Coef. Rank  Peers  Coef. Rank Peers 
Austria  0.667  14  Finland, UK  0.823 14  Japan, Sweden 
Belgium  0.801  10  Finland, UK  0.842 11  Japan, Sweden, UK 
Bulgaria  1.000 1  Bulgaria  1.000 1  Bulgaria 
Czech Republic  0.479  23  Japan, Lith., UK  0.518 21  Bulgaria, Ireland, UK 
Denmark  0.749 11  Finland,  Ireland  0.897 10  Ireland,  Sweden 
Estonia  0.719  12  Ireland, Poland, UK  0.830 13  Bulgaria, Japan, UK 
Finland  1.000 1  Finland  0.997 7  Ireland,  Sweden,  UK 
France  0.601  18  Ireland, Poland, UK  0.533 19  Bulgaria, Ireland, UK 
Germany  0.640 15  UK,  0.680 16  Japan,  Sweden 
Greece  0.359  24  Ireland, Poland, UK  0.353 25  Bulgaria, Japan, UK 
Hungary  0.604  17  Ireland, Poland, UK  0.647 17  Bulgaria, Ireland, UK 
Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland  1.000 1  Ireland 
Italy  0.490  20  Japan, UK  0.588 18  Japan, Sweden, UK 
Japan  1.000 1  Japan  1.000 1  Japan 
Lithuania  1.000 1  Lith.  1.000 1  Lith. 
Malta  0.638  16  Japan, Lith., UK  0.835 12  Bulgaria, Ireland, Lith. 
Netherlands  0.980  9  Finland, UK  0.914 9  Japan, Sweden, UK 
Poland  1.000  1  Poland  0.955 8  Bulgaria, Ireland, Lith. 
Portugal  0.487  21  Ireland, Poland, UK  0.525 20  Bulgaria, Japan, UK 
Slovakia  0.675  13  Japan, Lith., UK  0.758 15  Bulgaria, Ireland, Lith. 
Slovenia  0.288  25  Ireland, Poland, UK  0.396 24  Japan, Sweden, UK 
Spain  0.512  19  Ireland, Poland, UK  0.497 22  Bulgaria, Japan, UK 
Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden  1.000 1  Sweden 
United Kingdom  1.000 1  UK  1.000 1  UK 
United States  0.484 22  Finland,  Ireland  0.484 23  Ireland,  Sweden 
 
  139Appendix E - Stochastic Frontier Analysis alternative models 
 
TABLE E1: SFA ESTIMATION RESULTS WITHOUT STAFF POLICY 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: COST IN PERCENTAGE OF GDP) 
 
   Coefficient Standard-
Error 
t-ratio 
Cost function:    
constant -1.410 232.4  -0.006065 
lwgrad 0.2669 0.04363 6.118 
lwpub 0.2568 0.02584 9.941 
Inefficiency:          
constant 5.030 232.4  0.02164 
evaluation -0.03978 0.01388  -2.867 
funding rules -0.05180  0.01743  -2.973 
PISA2000 -0.007369 0.0009321  -7.906 
    
2 ˆε σ 0.03646 0.004091  8.912 




57.93       
 
 
Alternative stochastic frontier model: 
 
01 2 3 ln ln ln ln it it it it it it c wage wpub wgrad ββ β β ηε =+ + + ++, 
 
•  cit is the total cost with PGD institutions in country i, measured in real purchasing 
power standards euros per capita; 
•  wageit is an input price, the average wage in the services sector, measured in real 
purchasing power standards euros;  
•  wgradit, one of the considered outputs, are student graduations weighted by quality 
and per capita; 
•  wpubit, the other output, are publications weighted by citations per capita. 
 
  140TABLE E2: ALTERNATIVE SFA MODEL  
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REAL COST IN PPS) 
  Coefficient Standard-Error  t-ratio 
Cost function:   
constant -4.085  0.3918  -10.43 
lwage 0.2177  0.4958  4.390 
lwgrad 0.3046  0.04004  7.608 
lwpub 0.5260  0.1006  5.227 
Inefficiency:      
constant 0.9547  0.2502  3.815 
evaluation -0.07312  0.02674  -2.734 
funding rules  -0.05543  0.03859  -1.436 
      
2 ˆε σ   0.0511 0.007888  6.482 
γ 0.2359  0.1891  1.246 
 
LR statistic (γ=0) 15.17    
 
TABLE E3: ALTERNATIVE SFA MODEL, EFFICIENCY SCORES 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average Ranking 
(average) 
United Kingdom  0.909 0.912 0.915 0.915 0.908 0.912  na  na  0.912  1 
Netherlands  0.887 0.870 0.869 0.863 0.869 0.871 0.875 0.874  0.872  2 
Japan  0.873 0.865 0.863 0.862 0.865 0.851 0.845 0.854  0.860  3 
Hungary  0.847 0.844 0.848 0.858 0.848 0.843 0.873 0.877  0.855  4 
Germany  0.847 0.845 0.845 0.844 0.840 0.832 0.837 0.844  0.842  5 
Italy  0.839 0.828 0.822 0.812 0.817 0.821 0.855 0.856  0.831  6 
Ireland  0.831 0.814 0.794 0.819 0.826 0.848 0.853 0.856  0.830  7 
France  0.824 0.826 0.824 0.826 0.828 0.807 0.806 0.812  0.819  8 
Portugal  0.802 0.805 0.808 0.805 0.824 0.814  na  na  0.810  9 
Spain  0.826 0.825 0.810 0.805 0.802 0.801 0.803 0.804  0.810  10 
Belgium  na  0.750 0.801 0.798 0.803 0.815 0.824 0.827  0.802  11 
Sweden  0.766 0.762 0.761 0.768 0.766 0.764 0.770 0.784  0.768  12 
Austria  0.723 0.708 0.749 0.759 0.756 0.770 0.759 0.752  0.747  13 
Czech Republic  0.744 0.689 0.757 0.755 0.752 0.750 0.751 0.752  0.744  14 
Slovakia  na  0.742 0.746 0.723 0.728 0.723 0.697 0.721  0.726  15 
Finland  0.739 0.724 0.722 0.724 0.720 0.724 0.719 0.725  0.725  16 
Denmark  na  na  0.688 0.677 0.672 0.698 0.696 0.705  0.689  17 
United States  0.703 0.695 0.693 0.679 0.671 0.669 0.690 0.684  0.686  18 






  141Appendix F - Effectiveness alternative models 
 
TABLE F1: TERTIARY SPENDING, EFFICIENCY AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 







std. dev.  (0.120)  lprod98 
P-value 0.002 
coef. 0.132 
std. dev.  (0.699)  inv 
P-value 0.850 
coef. 0.983 





Sources and notes as under Table 16. 
Efficiency scores are those from table E3. 
 
TABLE F2: TERTIARY SPENDING, EFFICIENCY AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
REGRESSION RESULTS (ALL COUNTRIES) 
Equation (10)  (11), 
DEA1 
(11), 





coef.  -0.483*** -0.488*** -0.434*** -0.326*** -0.333*** -0.331***
std.  dev. (0.080) (0.084) (0.090) (0.112) (0.114) (0.113) lprod98 
P-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.003
coef.  0.739 0.762 0.954 0.208 0.050 0.140
std.  dev. (0.693) (0.690) (0.708) (0.615) (0.703) (0.694) inv 
P-value  0.286 0.269 0.178 0.735 0.943 0.841
coef.  3.456 2.763 4.473 1.494  -0.108 1.215
std.  dev. (2.937) (2.677) (3.593) (2.507) (4.607) (5.730) s or eff.s 
P-value  0.239 0.302 0.213 0.551 0.981 0.832
Obs  28 28 25 19 19 19
R
2  0.709 0.708 0.658 0.524 0.520 0.521
 
Sources and notes as under Table 16. 
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TABLE F3: TERTIARY SPENDING, EFFICIENCY, CAPITAL DEEPENING AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 






std. dev.  (0.140)  lprod98 
P-value 0.758 
coef. 1.191*** 
std. dev.  (0.360)  kl05/kl98 
P-value 0.001 
coef. 6.341 





Sources and notes as under Table 17. 
Efficiency scores are those from table E3. 
 
TABLE F4: TERTIARY SPENDING, EFFICIENCY, CAPITAL DEEPENING AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
REGRESSION RESULTS (ALL COUNTRIES) 








coef.  -0.029 -0.031 -0.011 -0.026 -0.029 
std.  dev. (0.111) (0.104) (0.105) (0.113) (0.110)  lprod98 
P-value  0.795 0.768 0.915 0.815 0.793 
coef.  0.983*** 1.065*** 1.174*** 1.019*** 1.092*** 
std.  dev. (0.301) (0.293) (0.298) (0.316) (0.301)  kl05/kl98 
P-value  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
coef.  3.298 3.706*  5.023***  4.646 6.709* 
std.  dev. (2.281) (1.919) (1.914) (3.483) (3.532)  s or eff.s 
P-value  0.148 0.053 0.009 0.182 0.058 
Obs  16 16 16 16 16 
R
2  0.484 0.520 0.552 0.473 0.511 
 
Sources and notes as under Table 17. 
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TABLE F5: TERTIARY SPENDING, EFFICIENCY AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
















Sources and notes as under Table 18. 
Efficiency scores are those from table E3. 
 
 
TABLE F6: TERTIARY SPENDING, EFFICIENCY AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
REGRESSION RESULTS (ALL COUNTRIES) 









coef.  3.457  3.950*  4.745** 4.180 5.986 
std. 
dev.  2.452 2.091 2.097 3.796 4.031 
s or eff.s 
P-value  0.159 0.059 0.024 0.271 0.138 
Obs  16 16 16 16 16 
R
2  0.097 0.172 0.195 0.063 0.115 
Sources and notes as under Table 18. 
 
 
  144TABLE F7: EFFICIENCY IN TERTIARY SPENDING AND UNEMPLOYMENT RISK OF ADULTS 
REGRESSION RESULTS (EU COUNTRIES ONLY, ALTERNATIVE SFA SCORES) 
      alternative 
SFA 
coef. 0.022** 














Sources and notes as under Table 19. 
Efficiency scores are those from table E3. 
 
 
TABLE F8: EFFICIENCY IN TERTIARY SPENDING AND UNEMPLOYMENT RISK OF ADULTS 
REGRESSION RESULTS (ALL COUNTRIES) 
      DEA1  DEA2  alternative 
SFA 
SFA 
coef.  0.023*** 0.022** 0.020**  0.022*** 
std.  dev.  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
gradshare 
P-value  0.004 0.011 0.020 0.005 
coef.  -0.595*** -0.661*** -0.527*** -0.592*** 
std.  dev.  (0.080) (0.077) (0.103) (0.116) 
U2564 
P-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
coef.  0.006 -0.007  0.011 -0.028 
std.  dev.  (0.011) (0.009) (0.032) (0.021) 
eff 
P-value  0.566 0.434 0.719 0.179 
Obs  28 25 19 19 
R
2  0.800 0.790 0.695 0.710 
 
Sources for EU countries and notes as under Table 19. For the USA and Japan, variable gradshare is an average 
of years 1999 and 2006, collected respectively from OECD(2001) and OECD(2008); the unemployment rates are 
2000-2006 averages, from OECD(2008) in the case of U2564ter and U2564sec, and from stats.oecd.org in the 
case of U2564. 
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TABLE F9: EFFICIENCY IN TERTIARY SPENDING AND UNEMPLOYMENT RISK OF YOUNG WORKERS 
REGRESSION RESULTS (EU COUNTRIES ONLY, ALTERNATIVE SFA SCORES) 
      alternative 
SFA 
coef. 0.023 














Sources and notes as under Table 20. 
Efficiency scores are those from table E3. 
 
 
 